C. Dong and J. Peters.
Proportional multiwinner voting with dynamic candidate sets.
2024.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Greger, E. Segal-Halevi, and W. Suksompong.
Optimal budget aggregation with star-shaped preferences.
2024.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt and F. Grundbacher.
The Banks set and the bipartisan set may be disjoint.
2024.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
P. Lederer, D. Peters, and T. Wąs.
The squared Kemeny rule for averaging rankings.
Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and
Computation (ACM-EC), 2024.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandl and F. Brandt.
An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium.
Theoretical Economics, 2024.
Forthcoming.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Greger, E. Segal-Halevi, and W. Suksompong.
Coordinating charitable donations.
2024.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and L. Tappe.
Stability based on single-agent deviations in additively
separable hedonic games.
Artificial Intelligence, 334:104160, 2024.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen.
Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for
strategyproof social decision schemes.
Social Choice and Welfare, 63(1):19–55, 2024.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and C. Dong.
On locally rationalizable social choice functions.
Theory and Decision, 2024.
Forthcoming.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandl and F. Brandt.
A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making.
Theoretical Economics, 19(2):667–703, 2024.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt and A. Wilczynski.
On the convergence of swap dynamics to Pareto-optimal
matchings.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 80:1063–1098,
2024.
[ pdf ]
F. Frank and P. Lederer.
The metric distortion of randomized social choice functions: C1
maximal lottery rules and simulations.
2023.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
M. Bullinger, P. Lenzner, and A. Melnichenko.
Network creation with homophilic agents.
2023.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
P. Lederer.
Bivariate scoring rules: Unifying the characterizations of
positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule.
2023.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and W. Suksompong.
Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison
preferences.
Games and Economic Behavior, 142:266–291, 2023.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and P. Lederer.
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness.
Theoretical Economics, 18(2):837–883, 2023.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and A. Wilczynski.
Reaching individually stable coalition structures.
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation,
11(1–2):4:1–65, 2023.
[ link |
pdf ]
T. Delemazure, T. Demeulemeester, M. Eberl, J. Israel, and P. Lederer.
The incompatibility of strategy-proofness and representation in
party-approval multi-winner elections.
Archive of Formal Proofs, 2022.
[ .html ]
F. Brandt.
Stochastic choice and dynamics based on pairwise comparisons.
2022.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt, C. Saile, and C. Stricker.
Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may
contain ties.
Journal of Economic Theory, 202:105447, 2022.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, M. Greger, D. Peters, C. Stricker, and W. Suksompong.
Funding public projects: A case for the Nash product rule.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 99:102585, 2022.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Matthäus, and C. Saile.
Minimal voting paradoxes.
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 34(4):527–551, 2022.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and M. Bullinger.
Finding and recognizing popular coalition structures.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 74:569–626, 2022.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Stricker.
An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery
schemes.
Social Choice and Welfare, 58(1):5–38, 2022.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer.
On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice
functions.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 73:1093–1130,
2022.
[ link |
pdf ]
M. Bullinger, W. Suksompong, and A. Voudouris.
Welfare guarantees in Schelling segregation.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 71:143–174, 2021.
[ link |
pdf ]
C. Saile and W. Suksompong.
Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments.
Social Choice and Welfare, 54(1):87–100, 2020.
F. Brandl and F. Brandt.
Arrovian aggregation of convex preferences.
Econometrica, 88(2):799–844, 2020.
[ link |
pdf ]
G. Bachmeier, F. Brandt, C. Geist, P. Harrenstein, K. Kardel, D. Peters, and
H. G. Seedig.
k-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant
number of voters.
Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 105:130–157, 2019.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, C. Geist, and J. Hofbauer.
Strategic abstention based on preference extensions: Positive
results and computer-generated impossibilities.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 66:1031–1056,
2019.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl and F. Brandt.
Justifying optimal play via consistency.
Theoretical Economics, 14(4):1185–1201, 2019.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, M. Olsen, and D. Peters.
Fractional hedonic games.
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 7(2):1–29,
2019.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl and D. Peters.
An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule.
Social Choice and Welfare, 52(4):685–707, 2019.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer.
Welfare maximization entices participation.
Games and Economic Behavior, 14:308–314, 2019.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, H. G. Seedig, and W. Suksompong.
On the structure of stable tournament solutions.
Economic Theory, 65(2):483–507, 2018.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl and T. Kavitha.
Two problems in max-size popular matchings.
Algorithmica, 81(7):2738–2764, 2018.
[ link ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, M. Eberl, and C. Geist.
Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness
via SMT solving.
Journal of the ACM, 65(2):1–28, 2018.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein.
Extending tournament solutions.
Social Choice and Welfare, 51(2):193–222, 2018.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and M. Brill.
On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness.
Games and Economic Behavior, 110:1–18, 2018.
[ link |
pdf ]
S. Albers, M. Bichler, F. Brandt, P. Gritzmann, and R. Kolisch.
Algorithmic Economics und Operations Research.
Informatik Spektrum, 40(2):165–171, 2017.
Special Issue “50 Jahre Informatik München”.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, C. Geist, and D. Peters.
Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 90:18–27, 2017.
Special Issue in Honor of Hervé Moulin.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl.
The distribution of optimal strategies in symmetric zero-sum
games.
Games and Economic Behavior, 104:674–680, 2017.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, and H. G. Seedig.
Minimal extending sets in tournaments.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 87:55–63, 2017.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and W. Suksompong.
The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak
preferences.
Economics Letters, 141:44–47, 2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
J. Hofbauer.
d-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 82:72–76, 2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig.
Consistent probabilistic social choice.
Econometrica, 84(5):1839–1880, 2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, and W. Suksompong.
An ordinal minimax theorem.
Games and Economic Behavior, 95:107–112, 2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and C. Geist.
Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT
solving.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 55:565–602, 2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and M. Brill.
Computing dominance-based solution concepts.
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 5(2):1–22,
2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, C. Geist, and P. Harrenstein.
A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto
optimality.
Social Choice and Welfare, 46(1):81–91, 2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. A. Hemaspaandra.
Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time
algorithms for single-peaked electorates.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 53:439–496, 2015.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt.
Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility
functions.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 60:123–133, 2015.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, A. Dau, and H. G. Seedig.
Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions.
Discrete Applied Mathematics, 187:41–49, 2015.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt.
Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness.
Social Choice and Welfare, 45(4):793–804, 2015.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, M. Brill, and J. Mestre.
Computational aspects of random serial dictatorship.
ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 13(2):26–30, 2014.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
Minimal retentive sets in tournaments.
Social Choice and Welfare, 42(3):551–574, 2014.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig.
Computing desirable partitions in additively separable hedonic
games.
Artificial Intelligence, 195:316–334, 2013.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein.
Pareto optimality in coalition formation.
Games and Economic Behavior, 82:562–581, 2013.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
On the rate of convergence of fictitious play.
Theory of Computing Systems, 53(1):41–52, 2013.
Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory.
[ link |
pdf ]
D. Baumeister, F. Brandt, F. Fischer, J. Hoffmann, and J. Rothe.
The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering
sets.
Theory of Computing Systems, 53(3):467–502, 2013.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill.
The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship.
Economics Letters, 121(3):341–345, 2013.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Chudnovsky, I. Kim, G. Liu, S. Norin, A. Scott, P. Seymour, and
S. Thomassé.
A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz.
Social Choice and Welfare, 40(3):739–743, 2013.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, Y. Bachrach, E. Elkind, and M. Paterson.
False-name manipulations in weighted voting games.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 40(57–93), 2011.
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum
games.
Theory of Computing Systems, 49(1):162–181, 2011.
Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and J. Hoffmann.
The computational complexity of weak saddles.
Theory of Computing Systems, 49(1):139–161, 2011.
Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer.
Equilibria of graphical games with symmetries.
Theoretical Computer Science, 412:675–685, 2011.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt.
Minimal stable sets in tournaments.
Journal of Economic Theory, 146(4):1481–1499, 2011.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein.
Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability.
Journal of Economic Theory, 146(4):1721–1731, 2011.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and M. Mair.
A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set.
Social Choice and Welfare, 34(4):597–609, 2010.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein.
Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional
games.
Theory and Decision, 69(2):233–256, 2010.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer.
Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium.
Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 75(3):163–177, 2009.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
The computational complexity of choice sets.
Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 55(4):444–459, 2009.
Special Issue on Computational Social Choice.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt.
Some remarks on Dodgson's voting rule.
Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 55(4):460–463, 2009.
Special Issue on Computational Social Choice.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and J. Hoffmann.
Computing Shapley's saddles.
ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 8(2), 2009.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and Y. Shoham.
Ranking games.
Artificial Intelligence, 173(2):221–239, 2009.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and T. Sandholm.
On the existence of unconditionally privacy-preserving auction
protocols.
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 11(2),
2008.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and F. Fischer.
Computing the minimal covering set.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 56(2):254–268, 2008.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt.
How to obtain full privacy in auctions.
International Journal of Information Security, 5(4):201–216,
2006.
[ link |
pdf ]
Conference and Other Papers
T. Delemazure, C. Dong, D. Peters, and M. Tydrichová.
Comparing ways of obtaining candidate orderings from approval
ballots.
In Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 2024.
[ pdf ]
E. Elkind, M. Greger, P. Lederer, W. Suksompong, and N. Teh.
Settling the score: Portioning with cardinal preferences.
Technical report, https://arxiv.org/pdf/2307.15586, 2024.
[ link ]
F. Brandt and P. Lederer.
Weak strategyproofness in randomized social choice.
2024.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Greger, E. Segal-Halevi, and W. Suksompong.
Optimal budget aggregation with single-peaked preferences.
In Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and
Computation (ACM-EC), 2024.
Forthcoming.
[ pdf |
venue ]
M. Bullinger and R. Romen.
Stability in online coalition formation.
In Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 9537–9545, 2024.
[ pdf |
venue ]
M. Bullinger, C. Dong, P. Lederer, and C. Mehler.
Participation incentives in approval-based committee elections.
In Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 9546–9554, 2024.
[ pdf ]
C. Dong and P. Lederer.
Refined characterizations of approval-based committee scoring
rules.
In Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), 2024.
Forthcoming.
[ pdf ]
M. Bullinger and R. Romen.
Online coalition formation under random arrival or coalition
dissolution.
In Proceedings of the 31st Annual European Symposium on
Algorithms (ESA), pages 27:1–27:18, 2023.
[ pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Greger, E. Segal-Halevi, and W. Suksompong.
Balanced donor coordination.
In Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and
Computation (ACM-EC), page 299, 2023.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
C. Dong and P. Lederer.
Characterizations of sequential valuation rules.
In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1697–1705, 2023.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
N. Boehmer, M. Bullinger, and A. M. Kerkmann.
Causes of stability in dynamic coalition formation.
In Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 5499–5506, 2023.
[ pdf |
venue ]
M. Bullinger and W. Suksompong.
Topological distance games.
In Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 5549–5556, 2023.
[ pdf |
venue ]
T. Delemazure, T. Demeulemeester, M. Eberl, J. Israel, and P. Lederer.
Strategyproofness and proportionality in party-approval
multiwinner elections.
In Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 5591–5599, 2023.
[ pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and S. Tausch.
Strategyproof social decision schemes on super Condorcet
domains.
In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1734–1742, 2023.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
J. Bäumler, M. Bullinger, S. Kober, and D. Zhu.
Superiority of instantaneous decisions in thin dynamic matching
markets.
In Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and
Computation (ACM-EC), page 390, 2023.
[ pdf ]
M. Bullinger.
Boundaries to single-agent stability in additively separable
hedonic games.
In Proceedings of the 47th International Symposium on
Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS), pages 26:1–26:15,
2022.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and W. Suksompong.
Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison
preferences.
In Proceedings of the 31st International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 130–136, 2022.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
M. Bullinger, P. Lenzner, and A. Melnichenko.
Network creation with homophilic agents.
In Proceedings of the 31th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 151–157, 2022.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen.
Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for
strategyproof social decision schemes.
In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 181–189, 2022.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and L. Tappe.
Single-agent dynamics in additively separable hedonic games.
In Proceedings of the 36th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 4867–4874, 2022.
[ pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, M. Greger, D. Peters, C. Stricker, and W. Suksompong.
Funding public projects: A case for the Nash product rule.
In Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Web and
Internet Economics (WINE), 2021.
[ pdf |
venue ]
P. Lederer.
Strategyproof randomized social choice for restricted sets of
utility functions.
In Proceedings of the 30th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 306–312, 2021.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
P. Lederer.
Non-manipulability in set-valued and probabilistic social choice
theory (doctoral consortium).
In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1823–1825, 2021.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
M. Bullinger and S. Kober.
Loyalty in cardinal hedonic games.
In Proceedings of the 30th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 66–72, 2021.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
M. Bullinger.
Computing desirable outcomes in specific multi-agent scenarios
(doctoral consortium).
In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1799–1801, 2021.
[ link |
venue ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, D. Peters, and C. Stricker.
Distribution rules under dichotomous preferences: Two out of
three ain't bad.
In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and
Computation (ACM-EC), pages 158–179, 2021.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer.
On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice
functions.
In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 251–259, 2021.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and A. Wilczynski.
Reaching individually stable coalition structures in hedonic
games.
In Proceedings of the 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 5211–5218, 2021.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
M. Bullinger, W. Suksompong, and A. Voudouris.
Welfare guarantees in Schelling segregation.
In Proceedings of the 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 5236–5243, 2021.
[ link |
venue ]
F. Brandt, C. Geist, and M. Strobel.
Analyzing the practical relevance of the Condorcet loser
paradox and the agenda contraction paradox.
In M. Diss and V. Merlin, editors, Evaluating Voting Systems
with Probability Models: Essays by and in Honor of William Gehrlein and
Dominique Lepelley, Studies in Choice and Welfare, pages 97–115.
Springer-Verlag, 2021.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, J. Hofbauer, and M. Strobel.
Exploring the no-show paradox for Condorcet extensions.
In M. Diss and V. Merlin, editors, Evaluating Voting Systems
with Probability Models: Essays by and in Honor of William Gehrlein and
Dominique Lepelley, Studies in Choice and Welfare, pages 251–273.
Springer-Verlag, 2021.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and M. Bullinger.
Finding and recognizing popular coalition structures.
In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 195–203, 2020.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
M. Bullinger.
Pareto-optimality in cardinal hedonic games.
In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 213–221, 2020.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
D. Baumeister, A.-K. Selker, and A. Wilczynski.
Manipulation of opinion polls to influence iterative elections.
In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 132–140, 2020.
[ link ]
M. Bullinger.
Computing desirable partitions in coalition formation games
(doctoral consortium).
In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 2185–2187, 2020.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and A. Wilczynski.
On the convergence of swap dynamics to Pareto-optimal
matchings.
In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Web and
Internet Economics (WINE), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages
100–113. Springer-Verlag, 2019.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Collective choice lotteries: Dealing with randomization in
economic design.
In J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, and W. S. Zwicker, editors,
The Future of Economic Design, Studies in Economic Design, pages
51–56. Springer-Verlag, 2019.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, J. Hofbauer, and M. Strobel.
Exploring the no-show paradox for Condorcet extensions using
Ehrhart theory and computer simulations.
In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 520–528, 2019.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, E. Elkind, and P. Skowron.
Computational social choice: The first ten years and beyond.
In B. Steffen and G. Woeginger, editors, Computing and Software
Science, volume 10000 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS),
chapter 48–65. Springer-Verlag, 2019.
[ link |
pdf ]
C. Saile and W. Suksompong.
Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments.
In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Web and
Internet Economics (WINE), volume 11316 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science (LNCS), pages 393–407. Springer-Verlag, 2018.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt, C. Saile, and C. Stricker.
Voting with ties: Strong impossibilities via SAT solving.
In Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1285–1293, 2018.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Stricker.
An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery
schemes.
In Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 114–120, 2018.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandl and T. Kavitha.
Popular matchings with multiple partners.
In Proceedings of the 37th IARCS Annual Conference on
Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science
(FSTTCS), Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), pages
19:1–19:15. LZI, 2017.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, J. Hofbauer, and M. Suderland.
Majority graphs of assignment problems and properties of popular
random assignments.
In Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 335–343, 2017.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Rolling the dice: Recent results in probabilistic social
choice.
In U. Endriss, editor, Trends in Computational Social Choice,
chapter 1, pages 3–26. AI Access, 2017.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer.
Random assignment with optional participation.
In Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 326–334, 2017.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Geist.
Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness
via SMT solving.
In Proceedings of the 25th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 116–122, 2016.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, J. Hofbauer, and M. Suderland.
Majority graphs of assignment problems and properties of popular
random assignments.
In Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on
Computational Social Choice (COMSOC), 2016.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, C. Geist, and M. Strobel.
Analyzing the practical relevance of voting paradoxes via
Ehrhart theory, computer simulations, and empirical data.
In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 385–393, 2016.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, C. Geist, and D. Peters.
Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving.
In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 314–322, 2016.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and H. G. Seedig.
On the discriminative power of tournament solutions.
In Selected Papers of the International Conference on Operations
Research, OR2014, Operations Research Proceedings, pages 53–58.
Springer-Verlag, 2016.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia.
Introduction to computational social choice.
In F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia,
editors, Handbook of Computational Social Choice, chapter 1. Cambridge
University Press, 2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein.
Tournament solutions.
In F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia,
editors, Handbook of Computational Social Choice, chapter 3. Cambridge
University Press, 2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, C. Geist, and J. Hofbauer.
Strategic abstention based on preference extensions: Positive
results and computer-generated impossibilities.
In Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 18–24, 2015.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, G. Chabin, and C. Geist.
Pnyx: A powerful and user-friendly tool for preference
aggregation.
In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1915–1916, 2015.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer.
Incentives for participation and abstention in probabilistic
social choice.
In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1411–1419, 2015.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and M. Strobel.
Fractional hedonic games: Individual and group stability.
In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1219–1227, 2015.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, and H. G. Seedig.
Minimal extending sets in tournaments.
In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1539–1540, 2014.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein.
Fractional hedonic games.
In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 5–12, 2014.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt.
On the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in
randomized social choice.
In Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 545–551, 2014.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, C. Geist, and H. G. Seedig.
Identifying k-majority digraphs via SAT solving.
In Proceedings of the 1st AAMAS Workshop on Exploring Beyond the
Worst Case in Computational Social Choice (EXPLORE), 2014.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein.
Extending tournament solutions.
In Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 580–586, 2014.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt.
Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility
functions.
In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and
Computation (ACM-EC), pages 331–332, 2014.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
C. Geist.
Finding preference profiles of Condorcet dimension k via
SAT.
Technical report, https://arxiv.org/abs/1402.4303, 2014.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and C. Geist.
Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT
solving.
In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1193–1200, 2014.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill.
The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship.
In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Web and
Internet Economics (WINE), volume 8289 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science (LNCS), pages 24–25. Springer-Verlag, 2013.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, and U. Endriss.
Computational social choice.
In G. Weiß, editor, Multiagent Systems, chapter 6, pages
213–283. MIT Press, 2nd edition, 2013.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Stursberg.
On popular random assignments.
In Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Algorithmic
Game Theory (SAGT), volume 8146 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(LNCS), pages 183–194. Springer-Verlag, 2013.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, K. Kardel, and H. G. Seedig.
It only takes a few: On the hardness of voting with a constant
number of agents.
In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 375–382, 2013.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and H. G. Seedig.
A tournament of order 24 with two disjoint TEQ-retentive
sets.
Technical report, https://arxiv.org/abs/1302.5592, 2013.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill.
On the tradeoff between economic efficiency and
strategyproofness in randomized social choice.
In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 455–462, 2013.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz and B. de Keijzer.
Housing markets with indifferences: a tale of two mechanisms.
In Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 1249–1255, 2012.
H. Aziz, M. Brill, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, J. Lang, and H. G. Seedig.
Possible and necessary winners of partial tournaments.
In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 585–592, 2012.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz and F. Brandl.
Existence of stability in hedonic coalition formation games.
In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 763–770, 2012.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
M. Brill and F. Fischer.
The price of neutrality for the ranked pairs method.
In Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 1299–1305, 2012.
[ pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and M. Brill.
Computing dominance-based solution concepts.
In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
(ACM-EC), page 233, 2012.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz and T. B. Sørensen.
Path coalitional games.
In Proceedings of The Second Workshop on Cooperative Games in
Multiagent Systems (CoopMAS), 2011.
[ pdf ]
G. Christodoulou, K. Mehlhorn, and E. Pyrga.
Improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via
coordination mechanisms.
In Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Algorithms,
ESA'11, pages 119–130. Springer-Verlag, 2011.
[ pdf ]
H. Aziz and B. de Keijzer.
Complexity of coalition structure generation.
In P. Yolum and K. Tumer, editors, Proceedings of the 10th
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS), pages 191–198, 2011.
[ venue ]
F. Brandt.
From Arrow's impossibility to Schwartz's tournament
equilibrium set (Invited tutorial).
In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on
Relational and Algebraic Methods in Computer Science, volume 6663 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 50–51. Springer-Verlag,
2011.
[ link ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig.
Optimal partitions in additively separable hedonic games.
In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 43–48, 2011.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig.
Stable partitions in additively separable hedonic games.
In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 183–190, 2011.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein.
Pareto optimality in coalition formation.
In Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Algorithmic
Game Theory (SAGT), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 93–104.
Springer-Verlag, 2011.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Group-strategyproof irresolute social choice functions.
In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 79–84, 2011.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, and H. G. Seedig.
On the fixed-parameter tractability of composition-consistent
tournament solutions.
In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 85–90, 2011.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and M. Brill.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the strategyproofness of
irresolute social choice functions.
In Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of
Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), pages 136–142, 2011.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. G. Seedig.
Network flow optimization with minimum quantities.
In B. Hu, K. Morasch, S. Pickl, and M. Siegle, editors,
Operations Research Proceedings 2010, pages 295–300. Springer, 2010.
[ pdf ]
G. Christodoulou, K. Ligett, and E. Pyrga.
Contention resolution under selfishness.
In S. Abramsky, C. Gavoille, C. Kirchner, F. M. auf der Heide, and
P. Spirakis, editors, Proceedings of the 37th International Colloquium
on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP), volume 6199 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 430–441. Springer-Verlag, 2010.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
Minimal retentive sets in tournaments.
In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 47–54, 2010.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein.
Monotone cooperative games and their threshold versions.
In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1017–1024, 2010.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
On the rate of convergence of fictitious play.
In Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium on Algorithmic
Game Theory (SAGT), number 6386 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS),
pages 102–113. Springer-Verlag, 2010.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer.
On iterated dominance, matrix elimination, and matched paths.
In Proceedings of the 27th International Symposium on
Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), Leibniz International
Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), pages 107–118. LZI, 2010.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Auctions.
In B. Rosenberg, editor, Handbook of Financial Cryptography and
Security, chapter 2, pages 49–58. CRC Press, 2010.
[ link |
pdf ]
D. Baumeister, F. Brandt, F. Fischer, J. Hoffmann, and J. Rothe.
The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering
sets.
In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Algorithms
and Complexity (CIAC), number 6078 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(LNCS), pages 299–310. Springer-Verlag, 2010.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. A. Hemaspaandra.
Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time
algorithms for single-peaked electorates.
In Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 715–722, 2010.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz, O. Lachish, M. Paterson, and R. Savani.
Power indices in spanning connectivity games.
In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on
Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management (AAIM), volume 5564 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 55–67.
Springer-Verlag, 2009.
F. Brandt.
Tournament solutions – Extensions of maximality and their
applications to decision-making.
Habilitation Thesis, Faculty for Mathematics, Computer Science, and
Statistics, University of Munich, 2009.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum
games.
In Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic
Game Theory (SAGT), volume 5814 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(LNCS), pages 287–298. Springer-Verlag, 2009.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
Computational aspects of Shapley's saddles.
In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 209–216, 2009.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and J. Hoffmann.
The computational complexity of weak saddles.
In Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic
Game Theory (SAGT), volume 5814 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(LNCS), pages 238–249. Springer-Verlag, 2009.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer.
Equilibria of graphical games with symmetries.
In Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and
Network Economics (WINE), volume 5385 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science (LNCS), pages 198–209. Springer-Verlag, 2008.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and M. Mair.
A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set.
In Proceedings of the 23rd AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 38–43, 2008.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and F. Fischer.
On the hardness and existence of quasi-strict equilibria.
In Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic
Game Theory (SAGT), volume 4997 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(LNCS), pages 291–302. Springer-Verlag, 2008.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Minimal stable sets in tournaments.
Technical report, https://arxiv.org/abs/0803.2138, 2008.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and F. Fischer.
PageRank as a weak tournament solution.
In Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Internet and
Network Economics (WINE), volume 4858 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science (LNCS), pages 300–305. Springer-Verlag, 2007.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, T. Sandholm, and Y. Shoham.
Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auctions.
In Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1207–1214, 2007.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and Y. Shoham.
A game-theoretic analysis of strictly competitive multiagent
scenarios.
In Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1199–1206, 2007.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
The computational complexity of choice sets.
In Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of
Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), pages 82–91, 2007.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and F. Fischer.
Computational aspects of covering in dominance graphs.
In Proceedings of the 22nd AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 694–699, 2007.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
P. Harrenstein, F. Brandt, and F. Fischer.
Commitment and extortion.
In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 108–115, 2007.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer.
Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium.
In Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on
Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 4393 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 212–223. Springer-Verlag, 2007.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and Y. Shoham.
On strictly competitive multi-player games.
In Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 605–612, 2006.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
