Publications

M. Ş. Ahunbay and M. Bichler. On the uniqueness of bayesian coarse correlated equilibria in standard first-price and all-pay auctions. Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2025.

J. Bürgermeister, M. Bichler, and M. Schiffer. Convergence of adaptive pricing algorithms to equilibrium in platform competition. In Conference on Information Systems and Technology, CIST '24, October 2024. [ DOI | www: ]

M. Şeref Ahunbay, M. Bichler, T. Dobos, and J. Knörr. Solving large-scale electricity market pricing problems in polynomial time. European Journal of Operational Research, 318(2):605–617, 2024. [ DOI | http ]

F. R. Pieroth, K. Fitch, and L. Belzner. Detecting influence structures in multi-agent reinforcement learning. In International Conference on Machine Learning. PMLR, 2024.

F. R. Pieroth and M. Bichler. Alpha-rank-collections: Analyzing expected strategic behavior with uncertain utilities. In Economics and Computation. ACM, 2024.

M. Bichler, M. Ewert, and A. Ockenfels. Learning to bid against humans with unclear motives. Working Paper, 2024.

M. Bichler, M. Ewert, and A. Ockenfels. Beyond symmetric equilibrium analysis: Learning to bid against competitors with asymmetric utility functions. Working Paper, 2024.

M. Ahunbay, M. Bichler, and J. Knoerr. Pricing optimal outcomes in coupled and non-convex markets: Theory and applications to electricity markets. Operations Research, 2024. [ DOI | http ]

J. Knörr, M. Bichler, and T. Dobos. Zonal vs. nodal pricing: An analysis of different pricing rules in the german day-ahead market. Working Paper, 2024. [ arXiv | http ]

T. Dobos, M. Bichler, and J. Knörr. Finding stable price zones in european electricity markets: Aiming to square the circle? Working Paper, 2024. [ arXiv | http ]

S. Asseng, M. Bichler, R. Birner, C. Bieling, H. Gimpel, I. Grass, J. Kollmann, S. Leonhardt, F. Schurr, A. Stein, and W. Weisser. Hybrid intelligence for reconciling biodiversity and productivity in agriculture. Nature Food, 5:270–272, 2024. [ http ]

M. Bichler, A. Gupta, L. Mathews, and M. Oberlechner. Low revenue in display ad auctions: Algorithmic collusion vs. non-quasilinear preferences. In Conference on Information Systems and Technology, CIST '24, October 2024. [ DOI | www: ]

F. Brandt and C. Dong. On locally rationalizable social choice functions. Theory and Decision, 2024. Forthcoming. [ pdf ]

C. Dong, M. Bullinger, T. Wąs, L. Birnbaum, and E. Elkind. Selecting interlacing committees. 2024. Working paper. [ pdf ]

C. Dong and J. Peters. Proportional multiwinner voting with dynamic candidate sets. 2024. Working paper. [ pdf ]

T. Delemazure, C. Dong, D. Peters, and M. Tydrichová. Comparing ways of obtaining candidate orderings from approval ballots. In Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 2024. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Greger, E. Segal-Halevi, and W. Suksompong. Optimal budget aggregation with star-shaped preferences. 2024. Working paper. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt and F. Grundbacher. The Banks set and the bipartisan set may be disjoint. 2024. Working paper. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt and P. Lederer. Weak strategyproofness in randomized social choice. 2024. Working paper. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Greger, E. Segal-Halevi, and W. Suksompong. Optimal budget aggregation with single-peaked preferences. In Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC), 2024. Forthcoming. [ pdf ]

P. Lederer, D. Peters, and T. Wąs. The squared Kemeny rule for averaging rankings. Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC), 2024. [ pdf ]

M. Bullinger and R. Romen. Stability in online coalition formation. In Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 9537–9545, 2024.

M. Bullinger, C. Dong, P. Lederer, and C. Mehler. Participation incentives in approval-based committee elections. In Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 9546–9554, 2024. [ pdf ]

F. Brandl and F. Brandt. An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium. Theoretical Economics, 2024. Forthcoming. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Greger, E. Segal-Halevi, and W. Suksompong. Coordinating charitable donations. 2024. Working paper. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and L. Tappe. Stability based on single-agent deviations in additively separable hedonic games. Artificial Intelligence, 334:104160, 2024. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen. Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes. Social Choice and Welfare, 63(1):19–55, 2024. [ link | pdf ]

C. Dong and P. Lederer. Refined characterizations of approval-based committee scoring rules. In Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2024. Forthcoming. [ pdf ]

F. Brandl and F. Brandt. A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making. Theoretical Economics, 19(2):667–703, 2024. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt and A. Wilczynski. On the convergence of swap dynamics to Pareto-optimal matchings. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 80:1063–1098, 2024. [ pdf ]

M. Bichler, S. B. Lunowa, M. Oberlechner, F. R. Pieroth, and B. Wohlmuth. On the convergence of learning algorithms in bayesian auction games. Working Paper, (12), 2023. [ DOI | .pdf ]

M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, and M. Oberlechner. Computing bayes nash equilibrium strategies in auction games via simultaneous online dual averaging. Operations Research, 2023. [ DOI ]

E. Batziou and M. Bichler. Budget-feasible market design for biodiversity conservation: Considering incentives and spatial coordination. In Wirtschaftsinformatik (WI), 2023. [ http ]

M. Bichler and J. Knörr. Getting prices right on electricity spot markets: On the economic impact of advanced power flow models. Energy Economics, 126:106968, 2023. [ DOI ]

M. Ahunbay, M. Bichler, and J. Knörr. Challenges in designing electricity spot markets. NBER Proceedings in Market Design, 2023.

J. Bäumler, M. Bullinger, S. Kober, and D. Zhu. Superiority of instantaneous decisions in thin dynamic matching markets. ACM EC (Economics and Computation), (1):390, 2023. [ DOI | .pdf ]

D. Zhu, S. Minner, and M. Bichler. Information design for on-demand service platforms: A queueing-theoretic approach. SSRN, (1):1–55, 2023. [ DOI | http ]

N. Kohring, F. R. Pieroth, and M. Bichler. Enabling first-order gradient-based learning for equilibrium computation in markets. In International Conference on Machine Learning. PMLR, 2023.

M. Ahunbay, M. Bichler, and J. Knoerr. Pricing optimal outcomes in coupled and non-convex markets: Theory and applications to electricity markets. In ACM Economics and Computation. ACM, 2023.

M. Bichler, N. Kohring, M. Oberlechner, and F. Pieroth. Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games. European Journal on Operational Research, 311(2):660–678, December 2023. [ DOI | pdf ]

M. Bichler, S. Heidekrueger, and N. Kohring. Learning equilibria in asymmetric auction games. INFORMS Journal on Computing, 35(3):519–709, C2, August 2023. [ DOI | link ]

M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, and M. Oberlechner. Computing bayes nash equilibrium strategies in auction games via simultaneous online dual averaging. ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Juli 2023. [ DOI | pdf ]

F. Frank and P. Lederer. The metric distortion of randomized social choice functions: C1 maximal lottery rules and simulations. 2023. Working paper. [ pdf ]

M. Bullinger, P. Lenzner, and A. Melnichenko. Network creation with homophilic agents. 2023. Working paper. [ pdf ]

P. Lederer. Bivariate scoring rules: Unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule. 2023. Working paper. [ pdf ]

M. Bullinger and R. Romen. Online coalition formation under random arrival or coalition dissolution. In Proceedings of the 31st Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA), pages 27:1–27:18, 2023. [ pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Greger, E. Segal-Halevi, and W. Suksompong. Balanced donor coordination. In Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC), page 299, 2023. [ link | pdf ]

C. Dong and P. Lederer. Characterizations of sequential valuation rules. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1697–1705, 2023. [ link | pdf | venue ]

N. Boehmer, M. Bullinger, and A. M. Kerkmann. Causes of stability in dynamic coalition formation. In Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 5499–5506, 2023. [ pdf | venue ]

M. Bullinger and W. Suksompong. Topological distance games. In Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 5549–5556, 2023. [ pdf | venue ]

T. Delemazure, T. Demeulemeester, M. Eberl, J. Israel, and P. Lederer. Strategyproofness and proportionality in party-approval multiwinner elections. In Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 5591–5599, 2023. [ pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and W. Suksompong. Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences. Games and Economic Behavior, 142:266–291, 2023. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and S. Tausch. Strategyproof social decision schemes on super Condorcet domains. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1734–1742, 2023. [ link | pdf | venue ]

J. Bäumler, M. Bullinger, S. Kober, and D. Zhu. Superiority of instantaneous decisions in thin dynamic matching markets. In Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC), page 390, 2023. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt and P. Lederer. Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness. Theoretical Economics, 18(2):837–883, 2023. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and A. Wilczynski. Reaching individually stable coalition structures. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 11(1–2):4:1–65, 2023. [ link | pdf ]

Y. Kivva, J. Etesami, and N. Kiyavash. On identifiability of conditional causal effects. 2023.

G. Schwarz and M. Bichler. How to trade thirty thousand products: A wholesale market design for road capacity. Transportation Research Part A, 164:167–185, October 2022. [ DOI | link ]

M. Bichler, P. Gritzmann, P. Karaenke, and M. Ritter. On airport time slot auctions: A market design complying with the IATA scheduling guidelines. Transportation Science, 57(1):27–51, August 2022. [ DOI | link ]

F. R. Pieroth, K. Fitch, and L. Belzner. Detecting influence structures in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems. In AAAI-22 Workshop on Reinforcement Learning in Games (AAAI-RLG 22), Online, Online, February 28 2022. [ pdf ]

S. Xiyue, F. R. Pieroth, K. Schmid, M. Wirsing, and L. Belzner. On learning stable cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma with paid incentives. In 2022 DISCOLI Workshop on Distributed Collective Intelligence (DISCOLI 2022), Online, Online, July 11 2022.

M. Bichler, M. Ewert, and M. Oberlechner. Computing bayes nash equilibrium strategies in crowdsourcing contests. In 32nd Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems (WITS 2022), Copenhagen, 2022.

N. Kohring, C. Fröhlich, S. Heidekrüger, and M. Bichler. Equilibrium computation for auction games via multi-swarm optimization. In AAAI-22 Workshop on Reinforcement Learning in Games (AAAI-RLG 22), Online, Online, February 2022. [ pdf ]

M. Ewert, S. Heidekrüger, and M. Bichler. Approaching the overbidding puzzle in all-pay auctions: Explaining human behavior through bayesian optimization and equilibrium learning. In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Learning, 2022. [ pdf ]

E. Baldwin, M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, and P. Klemperer. Strong substitutes: structural properties, and a new algorithm for competitive equilibrium prices. Mathematical Programming, 191(2):1436–4646, 2022. [ DOI | pdf ]

M. Ş. Ahunbay, M. Bichler, and J. Knörr. Pricing optimal outcomes in coupled and non-convex electricity markets. In 32nd Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems (WITS 2022), Copenhagen, 2022.

M. Ş. Ahunbay, A. Ashour Novirdoust, R. Bhuiyan, M. Bichler, S. Bindu, E. Bjørndal, M. Bjørndal, H. U. Buhl, J. P. Chaves-Ávila, H. Gerard, S. Gross, L. Hanny, J. Knörr, C. S. Köhnen, L. Marques, A. Monti, K. Neuhoff, C. Neumann, E. Ocenic, M. Ott, M. Pichlmeier, J. C. Richstein, M. Rinck, F. Röhrich, P. M. Röhrig, A. Sauer, J. Strüker, M. Troncia, J. Wagner, M. Weibelzahl, and P. Zilke. Electricity market design 2030-2050: Shaping future electricity markets for a climate-neutral europe. 2022. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, J. Knörr, and F. Maldonado. Pricing in non-convex markets: How to price electricity in the presence of demand response. Information Systems Research, 34(2):652–675, July 2022. [ DOI | pdf ]

M. Bichler, H. U. Buhl, J. Knörr, F. Maldonado, P. Schott, S. Waldherr, and M. Weibelzahl. Electricity markets in a time of change: A call to arms for business research. Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 74:77–102, 2022. [ DOI | link ]

M. Bichler, P. Milgrom, and G. Schwarz. Taming the communication and computation complexity of combinatorial auctions: The FUEL bid language. Management Science, 69(4):2217–2238, June 2022. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

E. Batziou, M. Bichler, and M. Fichtl. Core-stability in assignment markets with financially constrained buyers. ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 23:473–474, 2022. [ DOI | pdf ]

S. Heidekrüger. Equilibrium learning in auction markets. In Proceedings of The Twenty-Seventh AAAI/SIGAI Doctoral Consortium (AAAI-DC 2022), Online, Online, 2022.

G. Schwarz and M. Bichler. Designing a large-scale wholesale market for urban congestion pricing. In Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Wirtschaftsinformatik, Nürnberg, Germany, 2022. [ .pdf ]

M. Fichtl, M. Oberlechner, and M. Bichler. Computing distributional bayes nash equilibria in auction games via gradient dynamics. In AAAI-22 Workshop on Reinforcement Learning in Games (AAAI-RLG 22), Online, Online, 2022. [ pdf | .pdf ]

T. Delemazure, T. Demeulemeester, M. Eberl, J. Israel, and P. Lederer. The incompatibility of strategy-proofness and representation in party-approval multi-winner elections. Archive of Formal Proofs, 2022. [ .html ]

M. Bullinger. Boundaries to single-agent stability in additively separable hedonic games. In Proceedings of the 47th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS), pages 26:1–26:15, 2022. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and W. Suksompong. Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences. In Proceedings of the 31st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 130–136, 2022. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt. Stochastic choice and dynamics based on pairwise comparisons. 2022. Working paper. [ pdf ]

M. Bullinger, P. Lenzner, and A. Melnichenko. Network creation with homophilic agents. In Proceedings of the 31th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 151–157, 2022. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen. Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes. In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 181–189, 2022. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and L. Tappe. Single-agent dynamics in additively separable hedonic games. In Proceedings of the 36th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 4867–4874, 2022. [ pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, C. Saile, and C. Stricker. Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties. Journal of Economic Theory, 202:105447, 2022. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, M. Greger, D. Peters, C. Stricker, and W. Suksompong. Funding public projects: A case for the Nash product rule. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 99:102585, 2022. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Matthäus, and C. Saile. Minimal voting paradoxes. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 34(4):527–551, 2022. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and M. Bullinger. Finding and recognizing popular coalition structures. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 74:569–626, 2022. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Stricker. An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes. Social Choice and Welfare, 58(1):5–38, 2022. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer. On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice functions. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 73:1093–1130, 2022. [ link | pdf ]

I. Fatkhullin, J. Etesami, N. He, and N. Kiyavash. Sharp analysis of stochastic optimization under global kurdyka-{\L} ojasiewicz inequality. 36th Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS), 2022.

Y. Kivva, E. Mokhtarian, J. Etesami, and N. Kiyavash. Revisiting the general identifiability problem. In Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI), pages 1022–1030. PMLR, 2022.

S. Akbari, J. Etesami, and N. Kiyavash. Minimum cost intervention design for causal effect identification. In International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), pages 258–289. PMLR, 2022.

E. Mokhtarian, F. Jamshidi, J. Etesami, and N. Kiyavash. Causal effect identification with context-specific independence relations of control variables. In International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, pages 11237–11246. PMLR, 2022.

J. Etesami, K. Zhang, and N. Kiyavash. A wasserstein-based measure of conditional dependence. Behaviormetrika, 49(2):343–362, 2022.

E. Mokhtarian, S. Akbari, F. Jamshidi, J. Etesami, and N. Kiyavash. Learning bayesian networks in the presence of structural side information. In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, volume 36, pages 7814–7822, 2022.

M. Fichtl. On the expressiveness of assignment messages. Economics Letters, 208:110051, 2021. [ DOI | http ]
In this note we prove that the class of valuation functions representable via integer assignment messages is a proper subset of strong substitutes valuations. Thus, there are strong substitutes valuations not expressible via assignment messages.

N. Kakimura and D. Zhu. Dynamic bipartite matching market with arrivals and departures. In Web and Internet Economics: 17th International Conference, WINE 2021, page 544, Online, Online, December 14-17 2021. [ DOI | pdf ]

M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, S. Heidekrüger, N. Kohring, and P. Sutterer. Learning equilibria in symmetric auction games using artificial neural networks. Nature Machine Intelligence, 3:687–695, August 2021. [ DOI | link | pdf | http ]

M. Ş. Ahunbay, B. Lucier, and A. Vetta. The price of stability of envy-free equilibria in multi-buyer sequential auctions. In Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, pages 18–33, Cham, 2021. Springer International Publishing.

M. Ş. Ahunbay and A. Vetta. Improved two sample revenue guarantees via mixed-integer linear programming. In Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, pages 3–17, Cham, 2021. Springer International Publishing.

A. Ashour Novirdoust, M. Bichler, C. Bojung, H. U. Buhl, G. Fridgen, V. Gretschko, L. Hanny, J. Knörr, F. Maldonado, K. Neuhoff, C. Neumann, M. Ott, J. C. Richstein, M. Rinck, M. Schöpf, P. Schott, A. Sitzmann, J. Wagner, J. Wagner, and M. Weibelzahl. Electricity spot market design 2030-2050. 2021. [ DOI ]

A. Ashour Novirdoust, R. Bhuiyan, M. Bichler, H. U. Buhl, G. Fridgen, C. Fugger, V. Gretschko, L. Hanny, J. Knörr, K. Neuhoff, C. Neumann, M. Ott, J. C. Richstein, M. Rinck, F. Röhrich, M. Schöpf, A. Sitzmann, J. Wagner, and M. Weibelzahl. Electricity market design 2030-2050: Moving towards implementation. 2021. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, J. Knörr, and F. Maldonado. Electricity pricing and minimum make-whole payments in the presence of non-convexities and price-sensitive demand. In 31st Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems (WITS 2021), Austin, TX, 2021. [ pdf ]

M. Bichler and S. Merting. Randomized scheduling mechanisms: Assigning course seats in a fair and efficient way. Production and Operations Management, 30(10):3540–3559, October 2021. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

M. Bichler and S. Waldherr. Core-pricing in combinatorial exchanges with financially constrained buyers: Computational hardness and algorithmic solutions. Operations Research, 70(1):241–264, November 2021. [ DOI | pdf ]

S. Heidekrüger, N. Kohring, P. Sutterer, and M. Bichler. Equilibrium learning in combinatorial auctions: Computing approximate bayesian nash equilibria via pseudogradient dynamics. In AAAI-21 Workshop on Reinforcement Learning in Games (AAAI-RLG 21), Online, Online, 2021.

S. Heidekrüger, N. Kohring, P. Sutterer, and M. Bichler. Multiagent learning for equilibrium computation in auction markets. In AAAI Spring Symposium on Challenges and Opportunities for Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (COMARL-21), Online, Online, 2021.

M. Bichler, R. Littmann, and S. Waldherr. Trading airport time slots: Market design with complex constraints. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 145:118–133, March 2021. [ DOI | pdf ]

G. Schwarz and M. Bichler. How to trade thirty thousand products: A wholesale market design for road capacity. In Workshop on Information Technology and Systems (WITS21), Austin, Texas, 2021.

E. Batziou, K. A. Hansen, and K. Høgh. Strong approximate consensus halving and the borsuk-ulam theorem. In 48th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP 2021, July 12-16, 2021, Glasgow, Scotland (Virtual Conference), 2021. [ DOI ]

M. Fichtl, M. Oberlechner, and M. Bichler. Approximating bayes nash equilibria in auction games via gradient dynamics. In 2021 NeurIPS Workshops on Strategic Machine Learning, Online, Online, 2021.

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, M. Greger, D. Peters, C. Stricker, and W. Suksompong. Funding public projects: A case for the Nash product rule. In Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2021. [ pdf | venue ]

M. Bullinger, W. Suksompong, and A. Voudouris. Welfare guarantees in Schelling segregation. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 71:143–174, 2021. [ link | pdf ]

P. Lederer. Strategyproof randomized social choice for restricted sets of utility functions. In Proceedings of the 30th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 306–312, 2021. [ link | pdf | venue ]

P. Lederer. Non-manipulability in set-valued and probabilistic social choice theory (doctoral consortium). In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1823–1825, 2021. [ link | pdf | venue ]

M. Bullinger and S. Kober. Loyalty in cardinal hedonic games. In Proceedings of the 30th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 66–72, 2021. [ link | pdf | venue ]

M. Bullinger. Computing desirable outcomes in specific multi-agent scenarios (doctoral consortium). In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1799–1801, 2021. [ link | venue ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, D. Peters, and C. Stricker. Distribution rules under dichotomous preferences: Two out of three ain't bad. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC), pages 158–179, 2021. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer. On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice functions. In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 251–259, 2021. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and A. Wilczynski. Reaching individually stable coalition structures in hedonic games. In Proceedings of the 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 5211–5218, 2021. [ link | pdf | venue ]

M. Bullinger, W. Suksompong, and A. Voudouris. Welfare guarantees in Schelling segregation. In Proceedings of the 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 5236–5243, 2021. [ link | venue ]

W. Trouleau, J. Etesami, M. Grossglauser, N. Kiyavash, and P. Thiran. Cumulants of hawkes processes are robust to observation noise. In International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), pages 10444–10454. PMLR, 2021.

J. Etesami, W. Trouleau, N. Kiyavash, M. Grossglauser, and P. Thiran. A variational inference approach to learning multivariate wold processes. In International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, pages 2044–2052. PMLR, 2021.

M. Bichler. Der Nobelpreis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften 2020 und seine Bezüge zum Operations Research. OR News, 69(3), 2020. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler. Comments on: Shared resources in collaborative vehicle routing. TOP, 28:21–24, April 2020. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, and G. Schwarz. Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature. Naval Research Logistics, 68(4):496–513, 2020. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, V. Grimm, S. Kretschmer, and P. Sutterer. Market design for renewable energy auctions: An analysis of alternative auction formats. Energy Economics, 92:104904, October 2020. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, Z. Hao, R. Littmann, and S. Waldherr. Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement. OR Spectrum, 42(3):965–994, 2020. [ DOI | pdf ]

M. Bichler, T. Morrill, and S. Waldherr. How to assign scarce resources without money: Designing information systems that are efficient, truthful, and (pretty) fair. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 32(2):335–355, 2020. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

S. Heidekrüger, P. Sutterer, N. Kohring, and M. Bichler. Learning bayesian nash equilibria in auction games. In INFORMS Workshop on Data Science, Online, 2020.

S. Heidekrüger, P. Sutterer, N. Kohring, and M. Bichler. Equilibrium learning in combinatorial auctions: Computing approximate bayesian nash equilibria via pseudogradient dynamics. In Workshop on Information Technology and Systems (WITS20), Online, Online, 2020.

P. Karaenke, M. Bichler, S. Merting, and S. Minner. Non-monetary coordination mechanisms for time slot allocation in warehouse delivery. European Journal of Operational Research, 286(3):897–907, 2020. [ DOI | pdf | http ]

P. Karaenke, M. Schiffer, and S. Waldherr. The customer is always right: A value-based matching mechanism for customer-centered ride pooling. In Proceedings of the INFORMS TSL Second Triennial Conference (TSL 2020), 2020. [ pdf ]

R. Littmann, B. M., and W. S. Incentive-compatible auction mechanisms for network procurement. In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Wirtschaftsinformatik, Potsdam, Germany, 2020.

R. Littmann and B. M. Real-time dynamic congestion pricing: An online optimization approach. In Workshop on Information Technology and Systems (WITS20), Online, 2020.

P. Paulsen, M. Bichler, and G. Kokott. The beauty of Dutch: Bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions. European Journal of Operational Research, 291(2):711–721, 2020. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, P. Milgrom, and G. Schwarz. Taming the communication and computation complexity of combinatorial auctions: The fuel bid language. In Conference on Information Systems and Technology (CIST2020), 7. November 2020, Online, 2020.

T. Widmer, P. Karaenke, and V. Sugumaran. Two‐sided service markets: Effects of quality differentiation on market efficiency. Managerial and Decision Economics, 2020. [ DOI | pdf | http ]

F. Brandt and M. Bullinger. Finding and recognizing popular coalition structures. In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 195–203, 2020. [ link | pdf | venue ]

M. Bullinger. Pareto-optimality in cardinal hedonic games. In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 213–221, 2020. [ link | pdf | venue ]

D. Baumeister, A.-K. Selker, and A. Wilczynski. Manipulation of opinion polls to influence iterative elections. In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 132–140, 2020. [ link ]

M. Bullinger. Computing desirable partitions in coalition formation games (doctoral consortium). In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 2185–2187, 2020. [ link | pdf | venue ]

C. Saile and W. Suksompong. Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments. Social Choice and Welfare, 54(1):87–100, 2020.

F. Brandl and F. Brandt. Arrovian aggregation of convex preferences. Econometrica, 88(2):799–844, 2020. [ link | pdf ]

J. Etesami and P. Geiger. Causal transfer for imitation learning and decision making under sensor-shift. In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, volume 34, pages 10118–10125, 2020.

M. Bichler, V. Fux, and J. Goeree. Designing environmental markets for trading catch shares. INFORMS Journal on Applied Analytics, 49(5):324–337, 2019. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, S. Merting, and A. Uzunoglu. Matching with bundle preferences: Tradeoff between fairness and truthfulness. In T. Ludwig and V. Pipek, editors, Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Wirtschaftsinformatik, pages 378 – 392. Universität Siegen, 2019.

M. Bichler, S. Merting, and A. Uzunoglu. Assigning course schedules: About preference elicitation, fairness, and truthfulness. In TBA, editor, Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS 2019), page TBA. TBA, 2019.

M. Bichler and S. Waldherr. Competitive equilibria in combinatorial exchanges with financially constrained buyers: Computational hardness and algorithmic solutions. ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 20, 2019. [ pdf ]

S. Heidekrüger, P. Sutterer, and M. Bichler. Computing approximate bayes-nash equilibria through neural self-play. In Workshop on Information Technology and Systems (WITS19), Munich, Germany, 2019.

P. Karaenke, M. Bichler, and S. Minner. Coordination is hard: Electronic auction mechanisms for increased efficiency in transportation logistics. Management Science, 65(12):5449–5956, 2019. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

P. Knoepfle, J. Knoerr, and S. Merting. Online auctions with dual-threshold algorithms: An experimental study and practical evaluation. In T. Ludwig and V. Pipek, editors, Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Wirtschaftsinformatik, pages 437 – 451. Universität Siegen, 2019.

G. Kokott, M. Bichler, and P. Paulsen. The beauty of Dutch: Ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale. European Journal on Operational Research, 278(1):202–210, 2019. [ DOI | pdf ]

G. Kokott, M. Bichler, and P. Paulsen. First-price split-award auctions in procurement markets with economies of scale. Production and Operations Management, 28(3):721–739, March 2019. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

R. Littmann, B. M., and W. S. Combinatorial exchanges for airport time slots. In Workshop on Information Technology and Systems (WITS19), Munich, Germany, 2019.

P. Sutterer, B. M., G. V., and K. S. Building up renewable energy: A market design for wind auctions. In Workshop on Information Technology and Systems (WITS19), Munich, Germany, 2019.

P. Sutterer, S. Waldherr, and M. Bichler. Are truthful bidders paying too much? Efficiency and revenue in display ad auctions. ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems, 10(2):1–18, 2019. [ DOI ]

G. Bachmeier, F. Brandt, C. Geist, P. Harrenstein, K. Kardel, D. Peters, and H. G. Seedig. k-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 105:130–157, 2019. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and A. Wilczynski. On the convergence of swap dynamics to Pareto-optimal matchings. In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 100–113. Springer-Verlag, 2019. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, C. Geist, and J. Hofbauer. Strategic abstention based on preference extensions: Positive results and computer-generated impossibilities. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 66:1031–1056, 2019. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, J. Hofbauer, and M. Strobel. Exploring the no-show paradox for Condorcet extensions using Ehrhart theory and computer simulations. In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 520–528, 2019. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandl and F. Brandt. Justifying optimal play via consistency. Theoretical Economics, 14(4):1185–1201, 2019. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, M. Olsen, and D. Peters. Fractional hedonic games. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 7(2):1–29, 2019. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandl and D. Peters. An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule. Social Choice and Welfare, 52(4):685–707, 2019. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer. Welfare maximization entices participation. Games and Economic Behavior, 14:308–314, 2019. [ link | pdf ]

W. Trouleau, J. Etesami, M. Grossglauser, N. Kiyavash, and P. Thiran. Learning hawkes processes under synchronization noise. In International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), pages 6325–6334. PMLR, 2019.

W. van der Aalst, M. Bichler, and A. Heinzl. Robotic process automation. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 60(4):269–272, 2018. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler. Views on the past, present, and future of business and information systems engineering. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 60(6):443–477, 2018. [ DOI | pdf ]

M. Bichler, S. Fadaei, and D. Kraft. A simple and fast algorithm for convex decomposition in relax-and-round mechanisms. Computers and Operations Research, 103:277–287, 2018. [ DOI | pdf ]

M. Bichler, V. Fux, and J. Goeree. A matter of equality: Linear pricing in combinatorial exchanges. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 29(4):1024–1043, 2018. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, V. Fux, and J. Goeree. Designing combinatorial exchanges for the reallocation of resource rights. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), 116(3):786–791, 2018. [ DOI | link ]

M. Bichler and S. Merting. Truthfulness in advertising? approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders. European Journal of Operational Research, 270(2):775–783, 2018. [ DOI | link ]

M. Bichler, S. Merting, and A. Uzunoglu. Assigning course schedules: About preference elicitation, fairness, and truthfulness. CoRR, abs/1812.02630, 2018. [ arXiv | link ]

M. Bichler and P. Paulsen. A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 111:20–40, September 2018. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

M. Bultmann, S. Knust, and S. Waldherr. Flow shop scheduling with fexible processing times. OR Spektrum, 40:809–829, 2018. [ DOI ]

M. Bultmann, S. Knust, and S. Waldherr. Synchronous fow shop scheduling with pliable jobs. European Journal of Operational Research, 270:943–956, 2018. [ DOI ]

N. Eschner and P. Sutterer. The potential of user behavioural data for a preventive exception handling mechanism. In Multikonferenz Wirtschaftsinformatik (MKWI) 2017: Band I, 2018. [ pdf ]

A. Goetzendorff, M. Bichler, and J. K. Goeree. Synergistic valuations and efficiency in spectrum auctions. Telecommunications Policy, 42(1):91–105, 2018. [ DOI | pdf | http ]

A. Heinzl, W. van der Aalst, and M. Bichler. Why the community should care about technology-centric journal rankings. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 60(2):91–93, 2018. [ DOI ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, H. G. Seedig, and W. Suksompong. On the structure of stable tournament solutions. Economic Theory, 65(2):483–507, 2018. [ link | pdf ]

C. Saile and W. Suksompong. Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), volume 11316 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 393–407. Springer-Verlag, 2018. [ pdf ]

F. Brandl and T. Kavitha. Two problems in max-size popular matchings. Algorithmica, 81(7):2738–2764, 2018. [ link ]

F. Brandt, C. Saile, and C. Stricker. Voting with ties: Strong impossibilities via SAT solving. In Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1285–1293, 2018. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Stricker. An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes. In Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 114–120, 2018. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, M. Eberl, and C. Geist. Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness via SMT solving. Journal of the ACM, 65(2):1–28, 2018. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein. Extending tournament solutions. Social Choice and Welfare, 51(2):193–222, 2018. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness. Games and Economic Behavior, 110:1–18, 2018. [ link | pdf ]

S. Salehkaleybar, J. Etesami, N. Kiyavash, and K. Zhang. Learning vector autoregressive models with latent processes. In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, volume 32, 2018.

A. Truong, N. Kiyavash, and S. R. Etesami. Adversarial machine learning: The case of recommendation systems. In 2018 IEEE 19th International Workshop on Signal Processing Advances in Wireless Communications (SPAWC), pages 1–5. IEEE, 2018.

W. van der Aalst, M. Bichler, and A. Heinzl. Responsible data science. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 59(5), 2017.

S. Albers, M. Bichler, F. Brandt, P. Gritzmann, and R. Kolisch. Algorithmic economics und operations research. Informatik Spektrum, 40(2):165–171, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler and J. K. Goeree. Frontiers in spectrum auction design. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 50:372–391, 2017. [ DOI | link ]

M. Bichler, V. Gretschko, and M. Janssen. Bargaining in spectrum auctions: a review of the german auction in 2015. Telecommunications Policy, 41(5-6):325–340, 2017. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, Z. Hao, and G. Adomavicius. Coalition-based pricing in ascending combinatorial auctions. Information Systems Research, 28(1):159–179, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, A. Heinzl, and W. van der Aalst. Business analytics and data science: Once again? Business and Information Systems Engineering, 58(2), 2017.

M. Bichler and S. Waldherr. Core and pricing equilibria in combinatorial exchanges. Economics Letters, 157:145 – 147, 2017. [ DOI | http ]

F. Diebold and M. Bichler. Matching with indifferences: A comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation. European Journal of Operational Research, 260(1):268–282, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

S. Fadaei and M. Bichler. Generalized assignment problem: Truthful mechanism design without money. Operations Research Letters, 45(1):72–76, 2017. [ pdf ]

S. Fadaei and M. Bichler. Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: On the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets. European Journal of Operational Research, 260(2):767–777, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

S. Fadaei and M. Bichler. A truthful mechanism for the generalized assignment problem. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), 5(3):14, 2017. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

A. Heinzl, M. Bichler, and W. van der Aalst. Trans-national joint research projects - defying the odds of national inter-university competition. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 59(4), 2017.

A. Heinzl, M. Bichler, and W. van der Aalst. Trans-national joint research projects. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 59(4), 2017.

L. Martin and P. Karaenke. The vehicle for hire problem: A generalized kolkata paise restaurant problem. In Proceedings of the 27th Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems (WITS 2017), December, 14–15, Seoul, South Korea, 2017. [ pdf ]

M. Strehler, S. Merting, and C. Schwan. Energy-efficient shortest routes for electric and hybrid vehicles. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 103(Supplement C):111 – 135, 2017. Green Urban Transportation. [ DOI | http ]

P. Sutterer, S. Waldherr, and M. Bichler. Are truthful bidders paying too much? efficiency and revenue in display ad auctions. In Workshop on Information Technology and Systems (WITS17), Seoul, South Korea, 2017.

S. Waldherr and S. Knust. Decomposition algorithms for synchronous flow shop problems with additional resources and setup times. European Journal of Operational Research, 259(3):847–863, 2017.

S. Waldherr, S. Knust, and D. Briskorn. Synchronous flow shop problems: How much can we gain by leaving machines idle? Omega, 72:15–24, 2017.

F. Brandl and T. Kavitha. Popular matchings with multiple partners. In Proceedings of the 37th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS), Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), pages 19:1–19:15. LZI, 2017. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, J. Hofbauer, and M. Suderland. Majority graphs of assignment problems and properties of popular random assignments. In Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 335–343, 2017. [ link | pdf | venue ]

S. Albers, M. Bichler, F. Brandt, P. Gritzmann, and R. Kolisch. Algorithmic Economics und Operations Research. Informatik Spektrum, 40(2):165–171, 2017. Special Issue “50 Jahre Informatik München”. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer. Random assignment with optional participation. In Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 326–334, 2017. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, C. Geist, and D. Peters. Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving. Mathematical Social Sciences, 90:18–27, 2017. Special Issue in Honor of Hervé Moulin. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandl. The distribution of optimal strategies in symmetric zero-sum games. Games and Economic Behavior, 104:674–680, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, and H. G. Seedig. Minimal extending sets in tournaments. Mathematical Social Sciences, 87:55–63, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

Y. Yang, J. Etesami, N. He, and N. Kiyavash. Online learning for multivariate hawkes processes. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS), 30, 2017.

J. Etesami, A. Habibnia, and N. Kiyavash. Econometric modeling of systemic risk: going beyond pairwise comparison and allowing for nonlinearity. 2017.

S. Salehkaleybar, J. Etesami, and N. Kiyavash. Identifying nonlinear 1-step causal influences in presence of latent variables. In 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), pages 1341–1345. IEEE, 2017.

Y. Yang, J. Etesami, and N. Kiyavash. Efficient neighborhood selection for walk summable gaussian graphical models. In 2017 51st Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems, and Computers, pages 263–267, 2017. [ DOI ]

A. Truong, S. R. Etesami, J. Etesami, and N. Kiyavash. Optimal attack strategies against predictors-learning from expert advice. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 13(1):6–19, 2017.

S. Etesami. Causal structure of networks of stochastic processes. 2017.

W. van der Aalst, M. Bichler, and A. Heinzl. Open research in business and information systems engineering. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 57(6), 2016.

M. Bichler, V. Fux, and J. Goeree. Linear payment rules for combinatorial exchanges. In International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS 2016), Dublin, 2016.

M. Bichler, A. Heinzl, and W. van der Aalst. Bise and the engineering sciences. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 58(2), 2016.

S. Fadaei and M. Bichler. Truthfulness and approximation with value-maximizing bidders. In Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2016. [ link ]

K. Guler, M. Bichler, and J. Petrakis. Ascending combinatorial auctions with risk averse bidders. INFORMS Group Decision and Negotiation, 25(3):609–639, May 2016. [ link | pdf ]

A. Heinzl, M. Bichler, and W. van der Aalst. Disciplinary pluralism, flagship conferences, and journal submissions. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 58(4), 2016.

P. Karaenke, J. Leukel, and V. Sugumaran. Using domain ontology for service replacement tasks: An empirical evaluation. In Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS 2016), December, 11–14, Dublin, Ireland, 2016. [ pdf ]

C. Kroemer, M. Bichler, and A. Goetzendorff. (Un)expected bidder behavior in spectrum auctions. INFORMS Group Decision and Negotiation, 25(1):31–63, 2016. [ link | pdf ]

S. Merting, P. Karaenke, and M. Bichler. Strategy-Proof Assignment of Bundles with Ordinal Preferences: An Application in Retail Logistics. In V. Nissen, D. Stelzer, S. Straßburger, and D. Fischer, editors, Multikonferenz Wirtschaftsinformatik (MKWI) 2016: Band I, pages 205–216. Universitätsverlag Ilmenau, 2016. [ pdf ]

P. Paulsen and M. Bichler. A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions. In International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS 2016), 2016.

A. Woke, M. Bichler, F. Chirigati, and V. Steeves. Reproducible experiments on dynamic resource allocation in cloud data centers. Information Systems, 59:98–101, 2016. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

A. Wolke, M. Bichler, and T. Setzer. Planning vs. dynamic control: Resource allocation in corporate clouds. IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing, 4(3):322–335, 2016. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and W. Suksompong. The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences. Economics Letters, 141:44–47, 2016. [ link | pdf ]

J. Hofbauer. d-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences. Mathematical Social Sciences, 82:72–76, 2016. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Consistent probabilistic social choice. Econometrica, 84(5):1839–1880, 2016. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Geist. Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness via SMT solving. In Proceedings of the 25th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 116–122, 2016. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, J. Hofbauer, and M. Suderland. Majority graphs of assignment problems and properties of popular random assignments. In Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC), 2016. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, C. Geist, and M. Strobel. Analyzing the practical relevance of voting paradoxes via Ehrhart theory, computer simulations, and empirical data. In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 385–393, 2016. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, C. Geist, and D. Peters. Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving. In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 314–322, 2016. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, and W. Suksompong. An ordinal minimax theorem. Games and Economic Behavior, 95:107–112, 2016. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and C. Geist. Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT solving. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 55:565–602, 2016. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and M. Brill. Computing dominance-based solution concepts. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 5(2):1–22, 2016. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, C. Geist, and P. Harrenstein. A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality. Social Choice and Welfare, 46(1):81–91, 2016. [ link | pdf ]

J. Etesami, N. Kiyavash, K. Zhang, and K. Singhal. Learning network of multivariate hawkes processes: A time series approach. UAI'16, page 162–171. AUAI Press, 2016.

J. Etesami, N. Kiyavash, and T. Coleman. Learning minimal latent directed information polytrees. Neural computation, 28(9):1723–1768, 2016.

J. Etesami and N. Kiyavash. Measuring causal relationships in dynamical systems through recovery of functional dependencies. IEEE Transactions on Signal and Information Processing over Networks, 3(4):650–659, 2016.

J. Etesami and N. Kiyavash. Interventional dependency graphs: An approach for discovering influence structure. In 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), pages 1158–1162. IEEE, 2016.

M. Bichler, K. Guler, and S. Mayer. Split-award procurement auctions: Can Bayesian equilibrium strategies predict human bidding behavior in multi-object auctions? Production and Operations Management, 24(6):1012–1027, June 2015. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler and G. Hao, Z. Adomavicius. Coordination and pricing in multi-object auctions. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS), Fort Worth, TX, USA, 2015.

M. Bichler, A. Heinzl, and R. Winter. Practice impact of IS research. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 57(2), 2015.

D. Dauer, P. Karaenke, and C. Weinhardt. Load balancing in the smart grid: A package auction and compact bidding language. In Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS 2015), December, 13–16, Fort Worth, TX, USA, 2015. [ pdf ]

A. Goetzendorff, M. Bichler, B. Day, and P. Shabalin. Compact bid languages and core-pricing in large multi-object auctions. Management Science, 61(7):1684 – 1703, 2015. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

A. Heinzl, R. Winter, and M. Bichler. Internationalization of information systems research and teaching. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 57(4), 2015.

P. Karaenke, M. Bichler, and S. Minner. Retail warehouse loading dock coordination by core-selecting package auctions. In Proceedings of the 23rd European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS 2015), May, 26–29, Muenster, Germany, 2015. [ pdf ]

S. Merting, C. Schwan, and M. Strehler. Routing of Electric Vehicles: Constrained Shortest Path Problems with Resource Recovering Nodes. In G. Italiano and M. Schmidt, editors, 15th Workshop on Algorithmic Approaches for Transportation Modelling, Optimization, and Systems (ATMOS 2015), volume 48 of OpenAccess Series in Informatics (OASIcs), pages 29–41, Dagstuhl, Germany, 2015. Schloss Dagstuhl–Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik. [ link ]

P. Paulsen and M. Bichler. Why bidders do not reduce demand in multi-unit auctions. In International Conference on Group Decision & Negotiation, 2015.

P. Paulsen and M. Bichler. Why bidders do not reduce demand in multi-unit auctions. In Conference on Economic Design, Istanbul, 2015.

P. Paulsen and M. Bichler. Bidding with allowances: Moral hazard in package auctions. In Conference on Information Systems and Technology (CIST 2015), 2015.

R. Winter, M. Bichler, and A. Heinzl. Teaching: The little brother of research. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 57(6), 2015.

A. Woke, B. Tsend-Ayush, C. Pfeiffer, and M. Bichler. More than bin packing: On dynamic resource allocation strategies in cloud computing. Information Systems, 51(C):83–95, 2015. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, C. Geist, and J. Hofbauer. Strategic abstention based on preference extensions: Positive results and computer-generated impossibilities. In Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 18–24, 2015. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. A. Hemaspaandra. Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 53:439–496, 2015. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt. Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 60:123–133, 2015. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, G. Chabin, and C. Geist. Pnyx: A powerful and user-friendly tool for preference aggregation. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1915–1916, 2015. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer. Incentives for participation and abstention in probabilistic social choice. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1411–1419, 2015. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and M. Strobel. Fractional hedonic games: Individual and group stability. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1219–1227, 2015. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, A. Dau, and H. G. Seedig. Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 187:41–49, 2015. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt. Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness. Social Choice and Welfare, 45(4):793–804, 2015. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler. Reflections on design science research in information systems. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 56(1):3, 2014.

M. Bichler, J. Goeree, S. Mayer, and P. Shabalin. Spectrum auction design: Simple auctions for complex sales. Telecommunications Policy, 38:613–622, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, K. Guler, and S. Mayer. Split-award procurement auctions. In VHB Jahrestagung, 2014.

M. Bichler, T. Hass, P. Loos, and R. Krishnan. Research areas in business and information systems engineering. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 56(1):2, 2014.

F. Diebold, H. Aziz, M. Bichler, F. Matthes, and A. Schneider. Course allocation via stable matching. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 56(2):111–125, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

S. Fadaei and M. Bichler. A truthful-in-expectation mechanism for the generalized assignment problem. In Web and Internet Economics, pages 247–248. Springer, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

Z. Hao, M. Bichler, and G. Adomavicius. Efficiency and rapid convergence: Coalition-based pricing in ascending. In VHB Jahrestagung, 2014.

D. Kraft, S. Fadaei, and M. Bichler. Fast convex decomposition for truthful social welfare approximation. In Web and Internet Economics, pages 120–132. Springer, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

C. Kroemer, M. Bichler, and A. Goetzendorff. (Un)expected bidder behavior in spectrum auctions. In WITS 2014, Auckland, NZ, 2014.

J. Kroß and A. Wolke. Cloudburst - simulating workload for iaas clouds. In IEEE 7th International Conference on Cloud Computing, June 2014.

J. Lemke, M. Bichler, and S. Minner. Fighting waiting times at the retail warehouse. In International Scientific Symposium on Logistics, 2014.

A. Wolke and C. Pfeiffer. Improving enterprise vm consolidation with high-dimensional load profiles. In IEEE 2nd International Conference on Cloud Engineering, March 2014.

A. Wolke and L. Ziegler. Evaluating dynamic resource allocation strategies in virtualized data centers. In IEEE 7th International Conference on Cloud Computing, June 2014.

F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, and H. G. Seedig. Minimal extending sets in tournaments. In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1539–1540, 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, M. Brill, and J. Mestre. Computational aspects of random serial dictatorship. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 13(2):26–30, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. Fractional hedonic games. In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 5–12, 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt. On the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in randomized social choice. In Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 545–551, 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, C. Geist, and H. G. Seedig. Identifying k-majority digraphs via SAT solving. In Proceedings of the 1st AAMAS Workshop on Exploring Beyond the Worst Case in Computational Social Choice (EXPLORE), 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein. Extending tournament solutions. In Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 580–586, 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt. Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC), pages 331–332, 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. Minimal retentive sets in tournaments. Social Choice and Welfare, 42(3):551–574, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and C. Geist. Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT solving. In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1193–1200, 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

J. Etesami and N. Kiyavash. A novel collusion attack on finite alphabet digital fingerprinting systems. In 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, pages 2237–2241. IEEE, 2014.

J. Etesami and N. Kiyavash. Directed information graphs: A generalization of linear dynamical graphs. In 2014 American control conference, pages 2563–2568. IEEE, 2014.

M. Bichler. Market Design - Foundations and Applications. In W. Abramowicz, editor, Business Information Systems, Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing. Springer, 2013.

M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and J. Wolf. Do core-selecting combinatorial clock auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs. Experimental Economics, 16(4):511–545, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and G. Ziegler. Efficiency with linear prices? A theoretical and experimental analysis of the combinatorial clock auction. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 24(2):394–417, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

A. Goetzendorff, M. Bichler, and R. Day. Core-pricing in large multi-object auctions: a market design for selling tv-ads. In Conference on Information Systems and Technology, 2013.

C. Hass, M. Bichler, and K. Guler. Optimization-based decision support for scenario analysis in sourcing markets with economies of scale and scope. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 12(3):152–165, 2013. [ link ]

I. Petrakis, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler. Ascending combinatorial auctions with allocation constraints: Game-theoretical and computational properties of generic pricing rules. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 24(3):768–786, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

A. Wolke, M. Bichler, and T. Setzer. Energy efficient virtual machine allocation in data centers: real-time control versus offline planning. In Workshop on Information Technology and Systems (WITS13), Milan, Italy, 2013.

A. Wolke and D. Srivastav. Monitoring and controlling research experiments in cloud testbeds. In Cloud Computing (CLOUD), 2013 IEEE Sixth International Conference on, pages 962–963, June 2013. [ DOI ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), volume 8289 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 24–25. Springer-Verlag, 2013. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Computing desirable partitions in additively separable hedonic games. Artificial Intelligence, 195:316–334, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. Pareto optimality in coalition formation. Games and Economic Behavior, 82:562–581, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Stursberg. On popular random assignments. In Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), volume 8146 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 183–194. Springer-Verlag, 2013. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, K. Kardel, and H. G. Seedig. It only takes a few: On the hardness of voting with a constant number of agents. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 375–382, 2013. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. On the tradeoff between economic efficiency and strategyproofness in randomized social choice. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 455–462, 2013. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the rate of convergence of fictitious play. Theory of Computing Systems, 53(1):41–52, 2013. Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory. [ link | pdf ]

D. Baumeister, F. Brandt, F. Fischer, J. Hoffmann, and J. Rothe. The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering sets. Theory of Computing Systems, 53(3):467–502, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship. Economics Letters, 121(3):341–345, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Chudnovsky, I. Kim, G. Liu, S. Norin, A. Scott, P. Seymour, and S. Thomassé. A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz. Social Choice and Welfare, 40(3):739–743, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

C. J. Quinn, J. Etesami, N. Kiyavash, and T. P. Coleman. Robust directed tree approximations for networks of stochastic processes. In 2013 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, pages 2254–2258. IEEE, 2013.

M. Bichler, Z. Hao, and C. Kroemer. Coordination support in ascending core-selecting combinatorial auctions. In Conference on Information Technologies and Systems (CIST12), Phoenix, AZ, USA, 2012.

K. Guler, I. Petrakis, and M. Bichler. Equilibrium bidding in ascending combinatorial auctions with risk averse bidders. In Conference on Information Systems and Technology (CIST), Phoenix, Arizona, USA, 2012. [ link ]

K. Guler, X. Zhen, S. Mayer, and M. Bichler. Strategic bidding in procurement auctions with multiple lots. In Informs, Phoenix, Arizona, USA, 2012. [ link ]

C. Hass, M. Bichler, and K. Guler. Optimization-based decision support for scenario analysis in sourcing markets with economies of scale and scope. In Workshop on Information Technology and Systems (WITS12), Orlando, FL, USA, 2012.

S. Mayer, P. Shabalin, and M. Bichler. Efficiency, auctioneer revenue, and bidding behavior in the combinatorial clock auction. In Perhaps experimental economics, Nov 12 2012.

I. Petrakis, C. Hass, and M. Bichler. On the impact of real-time information on field service scheduling. Decision Support Systems, 53(2):282–293, 2012. [ link | pdf ]

T. Scheffel, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler. On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions: An experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design. Experimental Economics, 15(4):667–692, 2012. [ link | pdf ]

M. Seibold, A. Wolke, M. Albutiu, M. Bichler, A. Kemper, and T. Setzer. Efficient deployment of main-memory dbms in virtualized data centers. In 2013 IEEE Sixth International Conference on Cloud Computing, volume 0, pages 311–318, Los Alamitos, CA, USA, 2012. IEEE Computer Society. [ DOI ]

T. Setzer and M. Bichler. Using matrix approximation for high-dimensional server allocation problems. European Journal on Operational Research, 227(1):62–75, 2012. [ link | pdf ]

T. Setzer and A. Wolke. Virtual machine re-assignment considering migration overhead. In Network Operations and Management Symposium (NOMS), 2012 IEEE, pages 631–634, April 2012. [ DOI ]

H. Aziz and B. de Keijzer. Housing markets with indifferences: a tale of two mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 1249–1255, 2012.

H. Aziz, M. Brill, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, J. Lang, and H. G. Seedig. Possible and necessary winners of partial tournaments. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 585–592, 2012. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz and F. Brandl. Existence of stability in hedonic coalition formation games. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 763–770, 2012. [ link | pdf | venue ]

M. Brill and F. Fischer. The price of neutrality for the ranked pairs method. In Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 1299–1305, 2012. [ pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt and M. Brill. Computing dominance-based solution concepts. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), page 233, 2012. [ link | pdf | venue ]

J. Etesami, N. Kiyavash, and T. P. Coleman. Learning minimal latent directed information trees. In 2012 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory Proceedings, pages 2726–2730. IEEE, 2012.

J. Etesami and W. Henkel. Ldpc code construction for wireless physical-layer key reconciliation. In 2012 1st IEEE International Conference on Communications in China (ICCC), pages 208–213. IEEE, 2012.

M. Bichler and K. Battacharya. It-service-management und it-automation: Methoden und modelle für effizienten it-betrieb (editorial). Business and Information Systems Engineering, 53(1):2, 2011.

M. Bichler, A. Gupta, and W. Ketter. Designing smart markets. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 21(4):688–699, 2011. [ link ]

M. Bichler, S. Schneider, K. Guler, and M. Sayal. Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope. European Journal on Operational Research, 214(1):67–77, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and J. Wolf. Efficiency, auctioneer revenue, and bidding behavior in the combinatorial clock auction. In The Se Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications, New York, 2011. ACM.

T. Dierkes, M. Bichler, and R. Krishnan. Estimating the effect of word of mouth on churn and cross-buying in the mobile phone market with markov logic networks. Decision Support Systems, 51(3):361–371, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

R. Jacob, T. Scheffel, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler. Hierarchical package bidding: Computational complexity & bidder behavior. In The Second Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications (AMMA), New York, 2011. ACM.

I. Petrakis, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler. Theoretical foundations of iterative combinatorial auctions with side constraints: Computational properties of generic pricing rules. In Conference on Information Systems and Technology (CIST), Charlotte, North Carolina, USA, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

T. Scheffel, A. Pikovsky, M. Bichler, and K. Guler. An experimental comparison of linear and non-linear price combinatorial auctions. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 22(2):346–368, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

T. Setzer and A. Stage. Filtering multivariate workload - non-conformance in large it-infrastructures. In 12th IFIP/IEEE Int. Symposium on Integrated Network Management, Dublin, Ireland, 2011. IEEE Publishing.

G. Ziegler and T. Scheffel. Theoretical and experimental insights into decentralized combinatorial auctions. In Wirtschafttsinformatik Proceedings 2011, Zürich, Schweiz, 2011. AIS. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz and T. B. Sørensen. Path coalitional games. In Proceedings of The Second Workshop on Cooperative Games in Multiagent Systems (CoopMAS), 2011. [ pdf ]

G. Christodoulou, K. Mehlhorn, and E. Pyrga. Improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via coordination mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Algorithms, ESA'11, pages 119–130. Springer-Verlag, 2011. [ pdf ]

H. Aziz, Y. Bachrach, E. Elkind, and M. Paterson. False-name manipulations in weighted voting games. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 40(57–93), 2011.

H. Aziz and B. de Keijzer. Complexity of coalition structure generation. In P. Yolum and K. Tumer, editors, Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 191–198, 2011. [ venue ]

F. Brandt. From Arrow's impossibility to Schwartz's tournament equilibrium set (Invited tutorial). In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Relational and Algebraic Methods in Computer Science, volume 6663 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 50–51. Springer-Verlag, 2011. [ link ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Optimal partitions in additively separable hedonic games. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 43–48, 2011. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Stable partitions in additively separable hedonic games. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 183–190, 2011. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. Pareto optimality in coalition formation. In Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 93–104. Springer-Verlag, 2011. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt. Group-strategyproof irresolute social choice functions. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 79–84, 2011. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, and H. G. Seedig. On the fixed-parameter tractability of composition-consistent tournament solutions. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 85–90, 2011. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt and M. Brill. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the strategyproofness of irresolute social choice functions. In Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), pages 136–142, 2011. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games. Theory of Computing Systems, 49(1):162–181, 2011. Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and J. Hoffmann. The computational complexity of weak saddles. Theory of Computing Systems, 49(1):139–161, 2011. Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Equilibria of graphical games with symmetries. Theoretical Computer Science, 412:675–685, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt. Minimal stable sets in tournaments. Journal of Economic Theory, 146(4):1481–1499, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein. Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability. Journal of Economic Theory, 146(4):1721–1731, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

J. Etesami, F. Hu, and W. Henkel. Lcd codes and iterative decoding by projections, a first step towards an intuitive description of iterative decoding. In 2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference-GLOBECOM 2011, pages 1–4. IEEE, 2011.

M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and G. Ziegler. Efficiency with linear prices: a theoretical and experimental analysis of the combinatorial clock auction. In EC '10: Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 285–286, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM. [ link | pdf ]

O. Hühn, C. Markl, and M. Bichler. On the predictive performance of queueing network models for large-scale distributed transaction processing systems. Information Technology & Management, 2-3:135–149, 2010. [ link | pdf ]

C. Markl, O. Hühn, and M. Bichler. Short-term performance management by priority-based queueing. Service Oriented Computing and Applications, Springer Verlag, 3(1):169–180, 2010. [ link | pdf ]

T. Scheffel, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler. Experimental insights in linear-price combinatorial auctions for selling spectrum licenses. In Asia-Pacific Economic Science Association (APESA) Conference, Melbourne, February 2010. [ link ]

T. Scheffel, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler. Experimental insights in linear-price combinatorial auctions for selling spectrum licenses. In Economic Sciencs Association (ESA) World Meeting, Copenhagen, July 2010. [ link ]

T. Scheffel, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler. On the impact of cognitive limits in combinatorial auctions: An experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design. In Jahrestagung der Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung e.V., Luxembourg, October 2010. [ link ]

S. Schneider, P. Shabalin, and M. Bichler. On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions. European Journal on Operational Research, 206(1):248–259, 2010. [ link | pdf ]

T. Setzer, K. Bhattacharya, and H. Ludwig. Change scheduling based on business impact analysis of change-related risk. IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management, Vol. 7(1):58–71, 2010. exclude. [ link ]

T. Setzer and A. Stage. Decision support for virtual machine reassignments in enterprise data centers. In Workshop on IEEE Business-Driven IT Management, Osaka, Japan, 2010. [ link ]

B. Speitkamp and M. Bichler. A mathematical programming approach for server consolidation problems in virtualized data centers. IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, 3(4):266–278, 2010. [ link | pdf ]

H. G. Seedig. Network flow optimization with minimum quantities. In B. Hu, K. Morasch, S. Pickl, and M. Siegle, editors, Operations Research Proceedings 2010, pages 295–300. Springer, 2010. [ pdf ]

G. Christodoulou, K. Ligett, and E. Pyrga. Contention resolution under selfishness. In S. Abramsky, C. Gavoille, C. Kirchner, F. M. auf der Heide, and P. Spirakis, editors, Proceedings of the 37th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP), volume 6199 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 430–441. Springer-Verlag, 2010. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and M. Mair. A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set. Social Choice and Welfare, 34(4):597–609, 2010. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein. Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games. Theory and Decision, 69(2):233–256, 2010. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. Minimal retentive sets in tournaments. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 47–54, 2010. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. Monotone cooperative games and their threshold versions. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1017–1024, 2010. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the rate of convergence of fictitious play. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), number 6386 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 102–113. Springer-Verlag, 2010. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. On iterated dominance, matrix elimination, and matched paths. In Proceedings of the 27th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), pages 107–118. LZI, 2010. [ link | pdf | venue ]

D. Baumeister, F. Brandt, F. Fischer, J. Hoffmann, and J. Rothe. The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering sets. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC), number 6078 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 299–310. Springer-Verlag, 2010. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. A. Hemaspaandra. Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates. In Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 715–722, 2010. [ link | pdf | venue ]

M. Bichler, A. Pikovsky, and T. Setzer. An analysis of design problems in combinatorial procurement auctions. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 51(1), 2009. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and A. Pikovsky. A computational analysis of linear price iterative combinatorial auction formats. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 20(1):33–59, 2009. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and G. Ziegler. Efficiency with linear prices? the combinatorial clock auction and its extensions. In INFORMS Annual Meeting, San Diego, 2009. [ link ]

T. Dierkes and M. Bichler. Modeling network effect with markov logic networks for churn prediction in the telecommunication industry. In Workshop on Statistical Challenges in E-Commerce (SCECR), May 30-31 2009.

T. Dierkes and M. Bichler. Identification of churn and fraud communities in large-scale customer networks. In Workshop on Statistical Challenges in E-Commerce (SCECR), May 30-31 2009.

C. Markl and O. Hühn. Evaluation of prioritization in performance models of dtp systems. In 11th IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing, Vienna (Austria), July 20-23 2009. [ link ]

T. Scheffel, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler. An experimental comparison of iterative combinatorial auction formats. In INFORMS Annual Meeting, San Diego, 2009. [ link ]

S. Schneider, M. Bichler, K. Guler, and M. Sayal. Solving winner determination problems for auctions with economies of scope and scale. In The First Conference on Auctions, Market mechanisms and Their Applications, Boston, USA, 2009. [ link ]

S. Schneider, M. Bichler, K. Guler, and M. Sayal. Bidding languages and supplier selection for procurement markets with economies of scale and scope. In IEEE Conference on E-Commerce Technology and Enterprise Computing, Vienna (Austria), July 20-23 2009. [ link ]

S. Schneider, P. Shabalin, and M. Bichler. Effects of suboptimal bidding in combinatorial auctions. In The First Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications, Boston, USA, 2009. [ link ]

T. Setzer. Data center workload consolidation based on truncated singular value composition of workload profiles. In WITS 2009, Phoenix, USA, 2009. [ link | pdf ]

T. Setzer, K. Bhattacharya, and H. Ludwig. System and method for automated decision support for service transition management. Patent, Oct. 30 2009.

A. Stage and T. Setzer. Network-aware migration control and scheduling of differentiated virtual machine workloads. In Workshop on Software Engineering Challenges in Cloud Computing at ICSE 2009, Vancouver, Canada, 2009. [ link | pdf ]

A. Stage, T. Setzer, and M. Bichler. Automated capacity management and selection of infrastructure-as-a-service providers. In 4th Workshop on Business-Driven IT Management, New York, USA, 2009. [ link | pdf ]

G. Ziegler. On the worst-case efficiency of the combinatorial clock auction. In EURO XXIII, Bonn, 2009. [ link ]

H. Aziz, O. Lachish, M. Paterson, and R. Savani. Power indices in spanning connectivity games. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management (AAIM), volume 5564 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 55–67. Springer-Verlag, 2009.

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 75(3):163–177, 2009. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. The computational complexity of choice sets. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 55(4):444–459, 2009. Special Issue on Computational Social Choice. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt. Some remarks on Dodgson's voting rule. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 55(4):460–463, 2009. Special Issue on Computational Social Choice. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and J. Hoffmann. Computing Shapley's saddles. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 8(2), 2009. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), volume 5814 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 287–298. Springer-Verlag, 2009. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. Computational aspects of Shapley's saddles. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 209–216, 2009. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and Y. Shoham. Ranking games. Artificial Intelligence, 173(2):221–239, 2009. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and J. Hoffmann. The computational complexity of weak saddles. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), volume 5814 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 238–249. Springer-Verlag, 2009. [ link | pdf | venue ]

M. Bichler. Kombinatorische Online-Verhandlung bei Audi - Wie Aristoteles irrte. Beschaffung aktuell, 9, 2008.

M. Bichler, K. Guler, F. Safai, M. Sayal, J. Amstrong, R. Hudson, and J. Price. Leveraging economies of scale and scope in enterprise strategic procurement. In HP TechCon, 2008.

C. Dinther, C. Holtmann, T. Setzer, A. Stage, and S. Stathel. Auctions for service brokerage in business value networks. In Joint Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation (GDN), Coimbra (Portugal), June 2008. [ link ]

C. Kiss and M. Bichler. Identification of influencers - measuring influence in customer networks. Decision Support Systems, 46(1):233–253, 2008. [ link | pdf ]

A. Paschke and M. Bichler. Knowledge representation concepts for automated sla management. Decision Support Systems, 46(1):187–205, 2008. [ link | pdf ]

T. Scheffel, A. Pikovsky, and M. Bichler. An experimental comparison of combinatorial procurement auctions. In Symposium des Bundesverband Materialwirtschaft, Einkauf und Logistik e.V., Würzburg, March 2008. [ pdf ]

T. Setzer. Handling multiple bottlenecks, service differentiation, and demand uncertainty in media on demand infrastructures. In IEEE Joint Conference on E-Commerce Technology (CEC2008) and Enterprise Computing, E-Commerce and E-Services (EEE 2008), Washington, 2008. IEEE Publishing. [ link ]

T. Setzer, K. Bhattacharya, and H. Ludwig. Decision support for service transition management. In IEEE Network Operations and Management Symposium (NOMS) 2008, Salvador, Brasilien, 2008. IEEE Publishing. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Equilibria of graphical games with symmetries. In Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), volume 5385 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 198–209. Springer-Verlag, 2008. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and M. Mair. A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set. In Proceedings of the 23rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 38–43, 2008. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt and T. Sandholm. On the existence of unconditionally privacy-preserving auction protocols. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 11(2), 2008. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and F. Fischer. Computing the minimal covering set. Mathematical Social Sciences, 56(2):254–268, 2008. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and F. Fischer. On the hardness and existence of quasi-strict equilibria. In Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), volume 4997 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 291–302. Springer-Verlag, 2008. [ link | pdf | venue ]

M. Bichler and T. Setzer. Admission control for media on demand services. Service Oriented Computing and Application, 1(1):65–73, 2007. [ link ]

H. Boley and A. Paschke. Expert querying and redirection with rule responder. In International ExpertFinder Workshop: FEWS2007 (Finding Experts on the Web with Semantics) at ISWC'07, Busan, Korea, 2007.

R. Brandl. Services and resource profiles as metrics for the allocation of it infrastructure costs. In 8. Internationale Tagung Wirtschaftsinformatik, Karlsruhe, Germany, 2007.

R. Brandl, M. Bichler, and M. Ströbel. Cost accounting for shared it infrastructures - estimating resource utilization in distributed it architectures. Wirtschaftsinformatik, 49(2):83–94, 2007. [ link | pdf ]

O. Hühn and C. Breitbarth. Performance modelling for sla-compliant but cost-effective it-service provisioning. In Workshop on Information Technologies & Systems (WITS 2007) at the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS 2007), Montreal, Canada, 2007.

O. Hühn and C. Markl. Permoto - performance modelling tool suite. In Workshop on Information Technologies & Systems (WITS 2007) at the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS 2007), Montreal, Canada, 2007.

A. Paschke. Sla management regelbasiert. Computerwoche, 9, 2007.

A. Paschke and A. Alghamdi. Rbsla based implementation for architectural management laws. In 4th International Conference on Innovations in Information Technology (Innovations 07), Dubai, United Arab Emirates, 2007.

A. Paschke, H. Boley, K. A., and B. Craig. Rule responder: Ruleml-based agents for distributed collaboration on the pragmatic web. In 2nd International Conference on the Pragmatic Web, Tilburg, Netherlands, 2007.

A. Paschke, A. Kozlenkov, and H. Boley. A homogenous reaction rules language for complex event processing. In International Workshop on Event Drive Architecture for Complex Event Process (EDA-PS 2007), Vienna, Austria, 2007.

A. Paschke and M. Schröder. Inductive logic programming for bio-informatics in prova. In 2nd Workshop on Data Mining in Bioinformatics (DMB 2007), Vienna, Austria, 2007.

P. Shabalin, B. Laqua, and A. Pikovsky. Improved rules for the resource allocation design. In 9th IEEE Conference on E-Commerce Technology (CEC' 07), 2007. [ pdf ]

B. Speitkamp, M. Bichler, and T. Setzer. Capacity planning for virtualized it service infrastructures. In POMS, editor, College of Service Operations 2007 Conference, London, U.K., 2007. [ link ]

F. Brandt and F. Fischer. PageRank as a weak tournament solution. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), volume 4858 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 300–305. Springer-Verlag, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, T. Sandholm, and Y. Shoham. Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auctions. In Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1207–1214, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and Y. Shoham. A game-theoretic analysis of strictly competitive multiagent scenarios. In Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1199–1206, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. The computational complexity of choice sets. In Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), pages 82–91, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt and F. Fischer. Computational aspects of covering in dominance graphs. In Proceedings of the 22nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 694–699, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

P. Harrenstein, F. Brandt, and F. Fischer. Commitment and extortion. In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 108–115, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium. In Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 4393 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 212–223. Springer-Verlag, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

A. Andreakis, A. Paschke, A. Benlian, M. Bichler, and T. Hess. Semantic web technologies for content reutilization strategies in publishing companies. In International Conference on Web Information Systems and Technologies (WEBIST06), Setubal, Portugal, 2006.

M. Bichler. Für Sie gelesen: Design Science in Information Systems Research. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 48(2):133–135, 2006.

M. Bichler and J. Kalagnanam. Software frameworks for advanced procurement auction markets. Communications of the ACM (CACM), 49(12):104–108, 2006. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler and J. Kalagnanam. A non-parametric estimator for setting reservation prices in procurement auctions. Information Technology and Management, 7(3):157–169, 2006. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler and K. J. Lin. Service-oriented computing: Composition and qos issues in business services networks. IEEE Computer, 39(3):99–101, 2006. [ link ]

M. Bichler and T. Setzer. Capacity management for virtualized servers. In WITS '06, Milwaukee, USA, 2006.

M. Bichler, T. Setzer, and B. Speitkamp. Capacity planning for virtualized servers. In Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA, 2006. [ pdf ]

M. Bichler, T. Setzer, and B. Speitkamp. A capacity planning and resource allocation method for virtualized servers. Patent, August 2006.

M. Bichler and R. Steinberg. E-auctions in procurement operations. Production and Operations Management, 2006.

R. Brandl. Reinraum-messungen zur verrechnung von it-anwendungen. In Multikonferenz Wirtschaftsinformatik 2006, Passau, Germany, 2006.

C. Kiss, A. Scholz, and M. Bichler. Evaluating centrality measures in large call graphs. In IEEE Joint Conference on E-Commerce Technology (CEC'06) and Enterprise Computing, E-Commerce and E-Services (EEE'06), San Francisco, USA, 2006.

A. Paschke. Verification, validation and integrity of distributed and interchanged rule based policies and contracts in the semantic web. In Int. Semantic Web and Policy Workshop (SWPW'06), Athens, Georgia, USA, 2006.

A. Paschke. A typed hybrid description logic programming language with polymorphic order-sorted dl-typed unification for semantic web type systems. In Int. Workshop OWL: Experiences and Directions 2006 (OWLED'06), Athens, Georgia, USA, 2006.

A. Paschke. Rule-based knowledge representation for service level agreements. In Doctoral Symposium at MATES'06, Essen, 2006.

A. Paschke. Eca-ruleml/eca-lp: A homogeneous event-condition-action logic programming language. In International Conference of Rule Markup Languages (RuleML'06), Athens, Georiga, USA, 2006. Short Paper.

A. Paschke, J. Dietrich, A. Giurca, G. Wagner, and S. Lukichev. On self-validating rule bases. In International Semantic Web Enabled Software Engineering Workshop (SWESE'06), Athens, Georgia, USA, 2006.

A. Paschke, A. Kozlenkov, H. Boley, M. Kifer, S. Tabet, M. Dean, and K. Barrett. Reaction ruleml. In 9th International Business Rules Forum, Washington DC, USA, November 2006.

A. Paschke and E. Schnappinger-Gerull. A categorization scheme for sla metrics. In MKWI 2006 Track on Service-oriented e-Commerce (MKWI), volume 80 of Lecture Notes in Informatics, Passau, Germany, 2006.

A. Pikovsky, P. Shabalin, and M. Bichler. Iterative combinatorial auctions with linear prices: Results of numerical experiments. In IEEE CEC'06, San Francisco, California, 2006. [ pdf ]

T. Setzer, M. Bichler, and O. Hühn. Adaptive zugriffskontrollverfahren - ein entscheidungsmodell für die kontrolle des zugriffs auf gemeinsam genutzte it-infrastrukturen. Wirtschaftsinformatik, 48(4):246–256, 2006. [ link ]

P. Shabalin, A. Pikovsky, and M. Bichler. An analysis of linear prices in iterative combinatorial auctions. In International Conference on Information Systems, Logistics and Supply Chain, Lyon, France, 2006. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and Y. Shoham. On strictly competitive multi-player games. In Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 605–612, 2006. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt. How to obtain full privacy in auctions. International Journal of Information Security, 5(4):201–216, 2006. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler and J.-Y. Chung. Special issues on service-oriented enterprise applications and web services composition. Information Systems and e-Business Management, June 2005.

M. Bichler and J. Kalagnanam. Configurable offers and winner determination in multi-attribute auctions. European Journal of Operational Research, 160(2):380–394, 2005. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, A. Pikovsky, and T. Setzer. Kombinatorische auktionen in der betrieblichen beschaffung - eine analyse grundlegender entwurfsprobleme. Wirtschaftsinformatik, 47(2), 2005. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler and T. Setzer. Verfahren zur steuerung eines zugriffs auf ressourcen eines datenverarbeitungssystems und steuerungsprogramm. Patent, September 12 2005.

J. Jürjens and P. Shabalin. Tools for secure systems development with uml: Security analysis with atps. In Fundamental Approaches to Software Engineering (FASE) 2005, page 14, Edinburgh, Scotland, 2005. Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science.

C. Kiss and M. Bichler. Leveraging network effects for predictive modelling in customer relationship management. In K. Tam and L. J. Zhao, editors, Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, pages 231–236, Las Vegas, USA, 2005.

A. Paschke. Rbsla - a declarative rule-based service level agreement language based on ruleml. In International Conference on Intelligent Agents, Web Technology and Internet Commerce (IAWTIC 2005), Vienna, Austria, 2005.

A. Paschke and M. Bichler. Sla representation, management and enforcement - combining event calculus, deontic logic, horn logic and event condition action rules. In IEEE International Conference on e-Technology, e-Commerce and e-Service (EEE'05), pages 158–163, Hong Kong, China, 2005.

A. Paschke, M. Bichler, and J. Dietrich. Contractlog: An approach to rule based monitoring and execution of service level agreements. In International Conference on Rules and Rule Markup Languages for the Semantic Web (RuleML 2005), volume LNCS, pages 209–217, Galway, Ireland, 2005. Springer.

A. Paschke and J. Dietrich. On the test-driven development and validation of business rules. In 4th International Conference on Information Systems Technology and its Applications (ISTA'2005), volume LNI Vol P, pages 31–48, Palmerston North, New Zealand, 2005. Gesellschaft fuer Informatik.

A. Paschke, J. Dietrich, and K. Kuhla. A logic based sla management framework. In 4th International Semantic Web Conference (ISWC 2005), pages 68–84, Galway, Ireland, 2005.

A. Paschke, C. Kiss, and S. Al-Hunaty. A pattern language for decentralized coordination and negotiation protocols. In IEEE International Conference on e-Technology, e-Commerce and e-Service (EEE'05), pages 404–407, Hong Kong, China, 2005.

A. Pikovsky and M. Bichler. Information feedback in iterative combinatorial auctions. In WI 2005, Bamberg, Germany, 2005. [ link ]

T. Priebe, C. Kiss, and J. Kolter. Semiautomatische annotation von textdokumenten mit semantischen metadaten. In WI 2005, Bamberg, Germany, 2005.

T. Setzer and M. Bichler. Revenue management models for it service providers using virtualization techniques. In INFORMS annual meeting 2005, San Francisco, USA, 2005.

T. Setzer and M. Bichler. Ertragsmanagementmodelle für virtualisierte it-infrastukturen. In Operations Research 2005, Bremen, Germany, 2005.

M. Bichler. On the design of multidimensional procurement auctions. In INFORMS/CORS Meeting, Banff, Canada, 2004.

M. Bichler and C. Kiss. A comparison of logistic regression, k-nearest neighbor, and decision tree induction for campaign management. In AMCIS, NY, USA, 2004.

M. Bichler and C. Kiss. Comparing classification methods for campaign management: A comparison of logistic regression, k-nearest neighbour, and decision tree induction. In Americas Conference on Information Systems, AMCIS, New York, USA, 2004.

M. Bichler and G. Richter. How to get value out of it. Information Management & Consulting, 2004.

R. Brandl. Resolving it chargeback heterogeneity - an architecture-based approach. In J. S. Constantinos, editor, First International Conference on Enterprise Systems and Accounting, pages 193–203, Thessaloniki, Greece, 2004.

J. Jürjens and P. Shabalin. A foundation for tool-supported critical systems development with uml. In 11th IEEE Conference on Engineering of Computer-Base Systems, Brno, Czech Republic, 2004.

J. Jürjens and P. Shabalin. Automated verification of umlsec models for security requirements. In 7th International UML Conference on Unified Modeling Language, Lisbon, Portugal, 2004.

C. Kiss and M. Bichler. Data mining and campaign management in the telecommunications industry. In P. o. t. M.-C. o. I. Systems, editor, MKWI 2004; Track: Coordination and Agent Technology in Value Networks, pages 61–74, Essen, 2004. GITO 2004.

M. Bichler. Special issue on business process integration and e-commerce infrastructure. Electronic Commerce Research Journal, 2003.

M. Bichler. Special issue on electronic negotiations. Group Decisions and Negotiations, 2003.

M. Bichler and J. Kalagnanam. A non-parametric estimator for reserve prices in procurement auctions. In ACM Conference on E-Commerce (EC 03), San Diego, USA, 2003.

M. Bichler, G. Kersten, and S. Strecker. Towards a structured design of electronic negotiations. Group Decisions and Negotiations, 2003.

A. Paschke and W. Zimmermann. Pamas - an agent-based supply chain event management system. In AMCIS 03, 2003.