Dr. Mete Şeref Ahunbay

E-Mail

mete.ahunbay@cit.tum.de 

Phone +49 (0) 89 289 17504
Fax +49 (0) 89 289 17535
Office

Boltzmannstraße 3
Room 01.10.057
85748 Garching, Germany

Office Hours By prior arrangement only.

About

I am a postdoctoral researcher at the Technical University of Munich, at the Department of Computer Science within the chair of Decision Sciences & Systems (You should know this already if you are viewing this page!). My research interests are primarily (convex) optimization and its applications, with an emphasis on electricity markets, efficiency of mechanisms, and learning (to bid) in auctions.

I have a multidisciplinary background: I obtained a BSc in Mathematics & Physics (Joint Honours) at McGill University, an MSc in Economics at the London School of Economics, and a PhD in Mathematics at again McGill University - the latter under the supervision of Prof. Adrian Vetta.

You may find my personal webpage here, which also contains my CV.

Page last updated: 30/05/2024.

Publications

Journal Publications

  • The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions [arXiv] [Springer (WINE'20)] [ACM (TEAC)]
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta.
    Presented at the 16th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE'20).
    In ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, accepted 27th February 2023.
  • Pricing Optimal Outcomes in Coupled and Non-Convex Markets: Theory and Applications to Electricity Markets [arXiv] [ACM]
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler, Johannes Knörr
    Presented at the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'23).
    In Operations Research, accepted
  • Solving Large-Scale Electricity Market Pricing Problems in Polynomial Time [arXiv] [Elsevier (EJOR)]
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler, Teodora Doboş, Johanner Knörr
    In European Journal of Operational Research, accepted 11th May, 2024.

Conference Papers

  • Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding [arXiv] [Springer]
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta
    In Proceedings of the 13th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'20).
  • The Price of Stability of Envy-Free Equilibria in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions [Springer]
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta
    In Proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'21).
  • Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programming [MATLAB/Mathematica Code] [arXiv] [Springer]
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta
    In Proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'21).

Outreach / Dissemination

  • Electricity Market Design 2030-2050: Shaping Future Electricity Markets for a Climate-Neutral Europe [Synergie]
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Amir Ashour Novirdoust, Rajon Bhuiyan, Martich Bichler, Shilpa Bindu, Entre Bjørndal, Metter Bjørndal, Hans Ulrich Buhl, José Pablo Chaves-Ávila, Helena Gerard, Stephan Gross, Lisa Hanny, Johannes Knörr, Clara Sophie Köhnen, Luciana Marques, Antonello Monti, Karsten Neuhoff, Christoph Neumann, Elena Ocenic, Marion Ott, Markus Pichlmeier, Jörn C. Richstein, Maximillian Rinck, Felix Röhrich, Paul Maximilian Röhrig, Alexander Sauer, Jens Strüker, Matteo Troncia, Johannes Wagner, Martin Weibelzahl, Philip Zilke
    Whitepaper, Kopernikus SynErgie & OneNet Project.
  • Recent Challenges in Designing Electricity Spot Markets [NBER]
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler, Johannes Knörr
    New Directions in Market Design, eds. I. Lo, M. Ostrovsky & P. Pathak, 2023.

In Preparation / Preprints

  • On the Convergence of No-Regret Learners to Approximate Bayes-Nash Equilibrium in Single Item Auctions [arXiv]
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler
  • Local (Coarse) Correlated Equilibria in Non-Concave Games [arXiv]
    Mete Şeref Ahunba

Teaching

Winter 2021/2022 Teaching Assistant

Auction Theory and Market Design 

Winter 2022/2023 Lecturer

Auction Theory and Market Design

Summer 2024 Seminar Organiser Seminar: Learning in Games