I am a PhD student in the group of Prof. Brandt since February 2020. Before that, I studied Informatics at TUM, where I received my Bachelor's degree in 2018 and my Master's degree in 2020. My research focuses on axiomatic aspects of collective decision making, in particular on how to avoid manipulability in elections.
I graduated in March 2024, and moved to UNSW Sydney to work as a postdoctoral fellow with Haris Aziz. You find my new webpage here.
Working Papers
F. Brandt and P. Lederer.
Weak strategyproofness in randomized social choice.
2024.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
F. Frank and P. Lederer.
The metric distortion of randomized social choice functions: C1
maximal lottery rules and simulations.
2023.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
P. Lederer.
Bivariate scoring rules: Unifying the characterizations of
positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule.
2023.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
Journal Papers
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen.
Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for
strategyproof social decision schemes.
Social Choice and Welfare, 63(1):19–55, 2024.
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F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and W. Suksompong.
Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison
preferences.
Games and Economic Behavior, 142:266–291, 2023.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt and P. Lederer.
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness.
Theoretical Economics, 18(2):837–883, 2023.
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F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer.
On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice
functions.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 73:1093–1130,
2022.
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Conference Papers
E. Elkind, M. Greger, P. Lederer, W. Suksompong, and N. Teh.
Settling the score: Portioning with cardinal preferences.
Technical report, https://arxiv.org/pdf/2307.15586v3, 2024.
P. Lederer.
Strategic manipulation in social choice theory.
PhD thesis, Technische Universität München, 2024.
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P. Lederer, D. Peters, and T. Wąs.
The squared Kemeny rule for averaging rankings.
Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and
Computation (ACM-EC), 2024.
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M. Bullinger, C. Dong, P. Lederer, and C. Mehler.
Participation incentives in approval-based committee elections.
In Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 9546–9554, 2024.
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C. Dong and P. Lederer.
Refined characterizations of approval-based committee scoring
rules.
In Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), 2024.
Forthcoming.
[ pdf ]
C. Dong and P. Lederer.
Characterizations of sequential valuation rules.
In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1697–1705, 2023.
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T. Delemazure, T. Demeulemeester, M. Eberl, J. Israel, and P. Lederer.
Strategyproofness and proportionality in party-approval
multiwinner elections.
In Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 5591–5599, 2023.
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F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and S. Tausch.
Strategyproof social decision schemes on super Condorcet
domains.
In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1734–1742, 2023.
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T. Delemazure, T. Demeulemeester, M. Eberl, J. Israel, and P. Lederer.
The incompatibility of strategy-proofness and representation in
party-approval multi-winner elections.
Archive of Formal Proofs, 2022.
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F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and W. Suksompong.
Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison
preferences.
In Proceedings of the 31st International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 130–136, 2022.
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pdf |
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F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen.
Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for
strategyproof social decision schemes.
In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 181–189, 2022.
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P. Lederer.
Strategyproof randomized social choice for restricted sets of
utility functions.
In Proceedings of the 30th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 306–312, 2021.
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P. Lederer.
Non-manipulability in set-valued and probabilistic social choice
theory (doctoral consortium).
In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1823–1825, 2021.
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venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer.
On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice
functions.
In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 251–259, 2021.
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pdf |
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