I am a member in the group of Felix Brandt since February 2019. I received my master's degree at Technische Universität München in 2019. In my master's thesis, I set up a taxonomy of computational properties of local search problems. I graduated in May 2023 with a PhD thesis on "Computing Desirable Outcomes in Coalition Formation".
My research interests encompass topics related to computational social choice, algorithmic game theory, combinatorial algorithms, or computational complexity. In my own research, I cover various scenarios in multi-agent systems with a focus on coalition formation. Apart from my central thesis work, I have worked on matching markets, the emergence of segregation, or voting theory. While I mostly apply algorithmic methods (like the efficient computability and computational boundaries of solution concepts), I am also intrigued by socio-scientific and philosophical paradigms.
Working Papers
C. Dong, M. Bullinger, T. Wąs, L. Birnbaum, and E. Elkind.
Selecting interlacing committees.
2024.
Working paper.
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Journal Articles
M. Bullinger, P. Lenzner, and A. Melnichenko.
Network creation with homophilic agents.
Social Choice and Welfare, 2024.
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F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and L. Tappe.
Stability based on single-agent deviations in additively
separable hedonic games.
Artificial Intelligence, 334:104160, 2024.
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F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and A. Wilczynski.
Reaching individually stable coalition structures.
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation,
11(1–2):4:1–65, 2023.
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F. Brandt and M. Bullinger.
Finding and recognizing popular coalition structures.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 74:569–626, 2022.
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F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer.
On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice
functions.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 73:1093–1130,
2022.
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M. Bullinger, W. Suksompong, and A. Voudouris.
Welfare guarantees in Schelling segregation.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 71:143–174, 2021.
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Conference Publications
M. Bullinger and R. Romen.
Stability in online coalition formation.
In Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 9537–9545, 2024.
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venue ]
M. Bullinger, C. Dong, P. Lederer, and C. Mehler.
Participation incentives in approval-based committee elections.
In Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 9546–9554, 2024.
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M. Bullinger and R. Romen.
Online coalition formation under random arrival or coalition
dissolution.
In Proceedings of the 31st European Symposium on Algorithms
(ESA), pages 27:1–27:18, 2023.
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venue ]
M. Bullinger.
Computing desirable outcomes in coalition formation.
PhD thesis, Technische Universität München, 2023.
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N. Boehmer, M. Bullinger, and A. M. Kerkmann.
Causes of stability in dynamic coalition formation.
In Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 5499–5506, 2023.
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venue ]
M. Bullinger and W. Suksompong.
Topological distance games.
In Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 5549–5556, 2023.
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venue ]
J. Bäumler, M. Bullinger, S. Kober, and D. Zhu.
Superiority of instantaneous decisions in thin dynamic matching
markets.
In Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and
Computation (ACM-EC), page 390, 2023.
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M. Bullinger.
Boundaries to single-agent stability in additively separable
hedonic games.
In Proceedings of the 47th International Symposium on
Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS), pages 26:1–26:15,
2022.
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M. Bullinger, P. Lenzner, and A. Melnichenko.
Network creation with homophilic agents.
In Proceedings of the 31th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 151–157, 2022.
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pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and L. Tappe.
Single-agent dynamics in additively separable hedonic games.
In Proceedings of the 36th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 4867–4874, 2022.
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venue ]
M. Bullinger and S. Kober.
Loyalty in cardinal hedonic games.
In Proceedings of the 30th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 66–72, 2021.
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pdf |
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M. Bullinger.
Computing desirable outcomes in specific multi-agent scenarios
(doctoral consortium).
In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1799–1801, 2021.
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venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer.
On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice
functions.
In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 251–259, 2021.
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pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and A. Wilczynski.
Reaching individually stable coalition structures in hedonic
games.
In Proceedings of the 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 5211–5218, 2021.
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pdf |
venue ]
M. Bullinger, W. Suksompong, and A. Voudouris.
Welfare guarantees in Schelling segregation.
In Proceedings of the 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 5236–5243, 2021.
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venue ]
F. Brandt and M. Bullinger.
Finding and recognizing popular coalition structures.
In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 195–203, 2020.
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pdf |
venue ]
M. Bullinger.
Pareto-optimality in cardinal hedonic games.
In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 213–221, 2020.
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pdf |
venue ]
M. Bullinger.
Computing desirable partitions in coalition formation games
(doctoral consortium).
In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 2185–2187, 2020.
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pdf |
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Teaching
Courses
Algorithmic Game Theory (SS 2019, SS 2020, SS2021, SS2023)
Discrete Structures (WS 2019/20, WS 2020/21)
Seminar on Economics and Computation (SS 2019)
Seminar on Markets, Algorithms, Incentives, and Networks (WS 2018/19, WS 2019/20, WS 2020/21, WS2021/22, WS2022/23)
Student Projects
Interdisciplinary project Computing Weak Saddles in Zero-Sum Games (Duna Mazzawi, in progress)
Bachelor's thesis Challenging Segregation by Attractiveness of Locations (Sebastian Rein, 2022)
Guided Research Random Dynamic Coalition Structure Generation (Viktoriia Lapshyna, 2022)
Master's thesis Applying the Multiplicative Weights Update Method to Symmetric Zero-Sum Games (Samareh Fazeli Arya, 2022)
Master's thesis Welfare Objectives in Schelling Segregation (Hannes Rittweger, 2021)
Master's thesis Capabilities and Limitations of Dynamics in Coalition Formation (Felix Bergmann, 2021)
Master's thesis Stability in Coalition Formation Games Based on Single-Agent Deviations (Leo Tappe, 2021)
Bachelor's thesis Determining the Value of Ultimate TicTacToe(Evghenii Beriozchin, 2020)
