F. Brandt and P. Lederer.
Weak strategyproofness in randomized social choice.
In Proceedings of the 39th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), 2025.
Forthcoming.
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F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen.
Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for
strategyproof social decision schemes.
Social Choice and Welfare, 63(1):19–55, 2024.
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F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and W. Suksompong.
Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison
preferences.
Games and Economic Behavior, 142:266–291, 2023.
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F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and S. Tausch.
Strategyproof social decision schemes on super Condorcet
domains.
In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1734–1742, 2023.
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F. Brandt and P. Lederer.
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness.
Theoretical Economics, 18(2):837–883, 2023.
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F. Brandt, C. Saile, and C. Stricker.
Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may
contain ties.
Journal of Economic Theory, 202:105447, 2022.
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F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer.
On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice
functions.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 73:1093–1130,
2022.
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F. Brandl, F. Brandt, M. Eberl, and C. Geist.
Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness
via SMT solving.
Journal of the ACM, 65(2):1–28, 2018.
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H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and M. Brill.
On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness.
Games and Economic Behavior, 110:1–18, 2018.
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F. Brandt.
Rolling the dice: Recent results in probabilistic social
choice.
In U. Endriss, editor, Trends in Computational Social Choice,
chapter 1, pages 3–26. AI Access, 2017.
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F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and W. Suksompong.
The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak
preferences.
Economics Letters, 141:44–47, 2016.
[ link |
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F. Brandt and C. Geist.
Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT
solving.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 55:565–602, 2016.
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F. Brandt.
Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness.
Social Choice and Welfare, 45(4):793–804, 2015.
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H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt.
On the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in
randomized social choice.
In Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 545–551, 2014.
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F. Brandt and M. Brill.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the strategyproofness of
irresolute social choice functions.
In Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of
Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), pages 136–142, 2011.
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