F. Brandt and C. Dong.
On locally rationalizable social choice functions.
Theory and Decision, 2025.
Forthcoming.
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F. Brandl and F. Brandt.
An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium.
Theoretical Economics, 19(4):1473–1504, 2024.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and L. Tappe.
Stability based on single-agent deviations in additively
separable hedonic games.
Artificial Intelligence, 334:104160, 2024.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen.
Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for
strategyproof social decision schemes.
Social Choice and Welfare, 63(1):19–55, 2024.
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F. Brandl and F. Brandt.
A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making.
Theoretical Economics, 19(2):667–703, 2024.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt and A. Wilczynski.
On the convergence of swap dynamics to Pareto-optimal
matchings.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 80:1063–1098,
2024.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and W. Suksompong.
Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison
preferences.
Games and Economic Behavior, 142:266–291, 2023.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt and P. Lederer.
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness.
Theoretical Economics, 18(2):837–883, 2023.
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F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and A. Wilczynski.
Reaching individually stable coalition structures.
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation,
11(1–2):4:1–65, 2023.
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F. Brandt, C. Saile, and C. Stricker.
Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may
contain ties.
Journal of Economic Theory, 202:105447, 2022.
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F. Brandl, F. Brandt, M. Greger, D. Peters, C. Stricker, and W. Suksompong.
Funding public projects: A case for the Nash product rule.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 99:102585, 2022.
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F. Brandt, M. Matthäus, and C. Saile.
Minimal voting paradoxes.
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 34(4):527–551, 2022.
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F. Brandt and M. Bullinger.
Finding and recognizing popular coalition structures.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 74:569–626, 2022.
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pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Stricker.
An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery
schemes.
Social Choice and Welfare, 58(1):5–38, 2022.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer.
On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice
functions.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 73:1093–1130,
2022.
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pdf ]
F. Brandl and F. Brandt.
Arrovian aggregation of convex preferences.
Econometrica, 88(2):799–844, 2020.
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pdf ]
G. Bachmeier, F. Brandt, C. Geist, P. Harrenstein, K. Kardel, D. Peters, and
H. G. Seedig.
k-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant
number of voters.
Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 105:130–157, 2019.
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pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, C. Geist, and J. Hofbauer.
Strategic abstention based on preference extensions: Positive
results and computer-generated impossibilities.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 66:1031–1056,
2019.
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pdf ]
F. Brandl and F. Brandt.
Justifying optimal play via consistency.
Theoretical Economics, 14(4):1185–1201, 2019.
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pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, M. Olsen, and D. Peters.
Fractional hedonic games.
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 7(2):1–29,
2019.
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pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer.
Welfare maximization entices participation.
Games and Economic Behavior, 14:308–314, 2019.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, H. G. Seedig, and W. Suksompong.
On the structure of stable tournament solutions.
Economic Theory, 65(2):483–507, 2018.
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pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, M. Eberl, and C. Geist.
Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness
via SMT solving.
Journal of the ACM, 65(2):1–28, 2018.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein.
Extending tournament solutions.
Social Choice and Welfare, 51(2):193–222, 2018.
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pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and M. Brill.
On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness.
Games and Economic Behavior, 110:1–18, 2018.
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pdf ]
S. Albers, M. Bichler, F. Brandt, P. Gritzmann, and R. Kolisch.
Algorithmic Economics und Operations Research.
Informatik Spektrum, 40(2):165–171, 2017.
Special Issue “50 Jahre Informatik München”.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt, C. Geist, and D. Peters.
Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 90:18–27, 2017.
Special Issue in Honor of Hervé Moulin.
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F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, and H. G. Seedig.
Minimal extending sets in tournaments.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 87:55–63, 2017.
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pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and W. Suksompong.
The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak
preferences.
Economics Letters, 141:44–47, 2016.
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pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig.
Consistent probabilistic social choice.
Econometrica, 84(5):1839–1880, 2016.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, and W. Suksompong.
An ordinal minimax theorem.
Games and Economic Behavior, 95:107–112, 2016.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt and C. Geist.
Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT
solving.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 55:565–602, 2016.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt and M. Brill.
Computing dominance-based solution concepts.
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 5(2):1–22,
2016.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt, C. Geist, and P. Harrenstein.
A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto
optimality.
Social Choice and Welfare, 46(1):81–91, 2016.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. A. Hemaspaandra.
Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time
algorithms for single-peaked electorates.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 53:439–496, 2015.
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pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt.
Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility
functions.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 60:123–133, 2015.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt, A. Dau, and H. G. Seedig.
Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions.
Discrete Applied Mathematics, 187:41–49, 2015.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt.
Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness.
Social Choice and Welfare, 45(4):793–804, 2015.
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pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, M. Brill, and J. Mestre.
Computational aspects of random serial dictatorship.
ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 13(2):26–30, 2014.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
Minimal retentive sets in tournaments.
Social Choice and Welfare, 42(3):551–574, 2014.
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pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig.
Computing desirable partitions in additively separable hedonic
games.
Artificial Intelligence, 195:316–334, 2013.
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pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein.
Pareto optimality in coalition formation.
Games and Economic Behavior, 82:562–581, 2013.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
On the rate of convergence of fictitious play.
Theory of Computing Systems, 53(1):41–52, 2013.
Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory.
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D. Baumeister, F. Brandt, F. Fischer, J. Hoffmann, and J. Rothe.
The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering
sets.
Theory of Computing Systems, 53(3):467–502, 2013.
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pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill.
The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship.
Economics Letters, 121(3):341–345, 2013.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Chudnovsky, I. Kim, G. Liu, S. Norin, A. Scott, P. Seymour, and
S. Thomassé.
A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz.
Social Choice and Welfare, 40(3):739–743, 2013.
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F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum
games.
Theory of Computing Systems, 49(1):162–181, 2011.
Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory.
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F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and J. Hoffmann.
The computational complexity of weak saddles.
Theory of Computing Systems, 49(1):139–161, 2011.
Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory.
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F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer.
Equilibria of graphical games with symmetries.
Theoretical Computer Science, 412:675–685, 2011.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt.
Minimal stable sets in tournaments.
Journal of Economic Theory, 146(4):1481–1499, 2011.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein.
Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability.
Journal of Economic Theory, 146(4):1721–1731, 2011.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and M. Mair.
A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set.
Social Choice and Welfare, 34(4):597–609, 2010.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein.
Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional
games.
Theory and Decision, 69(2):233–256, 2010.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer.
Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium.
Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 75(3):163–177, 2009.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
The computational complexity of choice sets.
Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 55(4):444–459, 2009.
Special Issue on Computational Social Choice.
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F. Brandt.
Some remarks on Dodgson's voting rule.
Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 55(4):460–463, 2009.
Special Issue on Computational Social Choice.
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F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and J. Hoffmann.
Computing Shapley's saddles.
ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 8(2), 2009.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and Y. Shoham.
Ranking games.
Artificial Intelligence, 173(2):221–239, 2009.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt and T. Sandholm.
On the existence of unconditionally privacy-preserving auction
protocols.
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 11(2),
2008.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt and F. Fischer.
Computing the minimal covering set.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 56(2):254–268, 2008.
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pdf ]
F. Brandt.
How to obtain full privacy in auctions.
International Journal of Information Security, 5(4):201–216,
2006.
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pdf ]
