My research interests cover most of the fundamental issues that arise when multiple self-interested entities, so-called agents, interact. These issues include modeling preferences over uncertain outcomes, analyzing optimal rational behavior, and studying mechanisms that allow agents to aggregate their individual preferences (such as voting or allocation rules). In addition to tools from mathematics and economics, concepts from theoretical computer science and artificial intelligence have turned out to be useful when analyzing such situations. In general, my research focuses on statements that can be proved or disproved using formal methods.
Brief Bio: I am a Professor for Algorithmic Game Theory in the Computer Science Department of TUM. Prior to this appointment, I was a Postdoctoral Fellow at Carnegie Mellon University and Stanford University and an Emmy Noether Junior Research Group Leader at Ludwig Maximilians University. I received my diploma and my doctoral degree from TUM.
F. Brandt, C. Dong, and D. Peters.
Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates.
2024.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Greger, E. Segal-Halevi, and W. Suksompong.
Optimal budget aggregation with star-shaped preferences.
2024.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt and F. Grundbacher.
The Banks set and the bipartisan set may be disjoint.
2024.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt and P. Lederer.
Weak strategyproofness in randomized social choice.
2024.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Greger, E. Segal-Halevi, and W. Suksompong.
Coordinating charitable donations.
2024.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt.
Stochastic choice and dynamics based on pairwise comparisons.
2022.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
BOOK CHAPTERS
F. Brandt, C. Geist, and M. Strobel.
Analyzing the practical relevance of the Condorcet loser
paradox and the agenda contraction paradox.
In M. Diss and V. Merlin, editors, Evaluating Voting Systems
with Probability Models: Essays by and in Honor of William Gehrlein and
Dominique Lepelley, Studies in Choice and Welfare, pages 97–115.
Springer-Verlag, 2021.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, J. Hofbauer, and M. Strobel.
Exploring the no-show paradox for Condorcet extensions.
In M. Diss and V. Merlin, editors, Evaluating Voting Systems
with Probability Models: Essays by and in Honor of William Gehrlein and
Dominique Lepelley, Studies in Choice and Welfare, pages 251–273.
Springer-Verlag, 2021.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt.
Collective choice lotteries: Dealing with randomization in
economic design.
In J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, and W. S. Zwicker, editors,
The Future of Economic Design, Studies in Economic Design, pages
51–56. Springer-Verlag, 2019.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, E. Elkind, and P. Skowron.
Computational social choice: The first ten years and beyond.
In B. Steffen and G. Woeginger, editors, Computing and Software
Science, volume 10000 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS),
chapter 48–65. Springer-Verlag, 2019.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt.
Rolling the dice: Recent results in probabilistic social
choice.
In U. Endriss, editor, Trends in Computational Social Choice,
chapter 1, pages 3–26. AI Access, 2017.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia.
Introduction to computational social choice.
In F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia,
editors, Handbook of Computational Social Choice, chapter 1. Cambridge
University Press, 2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein.
Tournament solutions.
In F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia,
editors, Handbook of Computational Social Choice, chapter 3. Cambridge
University Press, 2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, and U. Endriss.
Computational social choice.
In G. Weiß, editor, Multiagent Systems, chapter 6, pages
213–283. MIT Press, 2nd edition, 2013.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt.
Auctions.
In B. Rosenberg, editor, Handbook of Financial Cryptography and
Security, chapter 2, pages 49–58. CRC Press, 2010.
[ link |
pdf ]
JOURNAL ARTICLES
F. Brandt and C. Dong.
On locally rationalizable social choice functions.
Theory and Decision, 2024.
Forthcoming.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandl and F. Brandt.
An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium.
Theoretical Economics, 19(4):1473–1504, 2024.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and L. Tappe.
Stability based on single-agent deviations in additively
separable hedonic games.
Artificial Intelligence, 334:104160, 2024.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen.
Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for
strategyproof social decision schemes.
Social Choice and Welfare, 63(1):19–55, 2024.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl and F. Brandt.
A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making.
Theoretical Economics, 19(2):667–703, 2024.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt and A. Wilczynski.
On the convergence of swap dynamics to Pareto-optimal
matchings.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 80:1063–1098,
2024.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and W. Suksompong.
Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison
preferences.
Games and Economic Behavior, 142:266–291, 2023.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and P. Lederer.
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness.
Theoretical Economics, 18(2):837–883, 2023.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and A. Wilczynski.
Reaching individually stable coalition structures.
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation,
11(1–2):4:1–65, 2023.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, C. Saile, and C. Stricker.
Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may
contain ties.
Journal of Economic Theory, 202:105447, 2022.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, M. Greger, D. Peters, C. Stricker, and W. Suksompong.
Funding public projects: A case for the Nash product rule.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 99:102585, 2022.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Matthäus, and C. Saile.
Minimal voting paradoxes.
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 34(4):527–551, 2022.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and M. Bullinger.
Finding and recognizing popular coalition structures.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 74:569–626, 2022.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Stricker.
An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery
schemes.
Social Choice and Welfare, 58(1):5–38, 2022.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer.
On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice
functions.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 73:1093–1130,
2022.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl and F. Brandt.
Arrovian aggregation of convex preferences.
Econometrica, 88(2):799–844, 2020.
[ link |
pdf ]
G. Bachmeier, F. Brandt, C. Geist, P. Harrenstein, K. Kardel, D. Peters, and
H. G. Seedig.
k-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant
number of voters.
Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 105:130–157, 2019.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, C. Geist, and J. Hofbauer.
Strategic abstention based on preference extensions: Positive
results and computer-generated impossibilities.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 66:1031–1056,
2019.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl and F. Brandt.
Justifying optimal play via consistency.
Theoretical Economics, 14(4):1185–1201, 2019.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, M. Olsen, and D. Peters.
Fractional hedonic games.
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 7(2):1–29,
2019.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer.
Welfare maximization entices participation.
Games and Economic Behavior, 14:308–314, 2019.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, H. G. Seedig, and W. Suksompong.
On the structure of stable tournament solutions.
Economic Theory, 65(2):483–507, 2018.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, M. Eberl, and C. Geist.
Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness
via SMT solving.
Journal of the ACM, 65(2):1–28, 2018.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein.
Extending tournament solutions.
Social Choice and Welfare, 51(2):193–222, 2018.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and M. Brill.
On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness.
Games and Economic Behavior, 110:1–18, 2018.
[ link |
pdf ]
S. Albers, M. Bichler, F. Brandt, P. Gritzmann, and R. Kolisch.
Algorithmic Economics und Operations Research.
Informatik Spektrum, 40(2):165–171, 2017.
Special Issue “50 Jahre Informatik München”.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, C. Geist, and D. Peters.
Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 90:18–27, 2017.
Special Issue in Honor of Hervé Moulin.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, and H. G. Seedig.
Minimal extending sets in tournaments.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 87:55–63, 2017.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and W. Suksompong.
The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak
preferences.
Economics Letters, 141:44–47, 2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig.
Consistent probabilistic social choice.
Econometrica, 84(5):1839–1880, 2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, and W. Suksompong.
An ordinal minimax theorem.
Games and Economic Behavior, 95:107–112, 2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and C. Geist.
Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT
solving.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 55:565–602, 2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and M. Brill.
Computing dominance-based solution concepts.
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 5(2):1–22,
2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, C. Geist, and P. Harrenstein.
A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto
optimality.
Social Choice and Welfare, 46(1):81–91, 2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. A. Hemaspaandra.
Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time
algorithms for single-peaked electorates.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 53:439–496, 2015.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt.
Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility
functions.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 60:123–133, 2015.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, A. Dau, and H. G. Seedig.
Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions.
Discrete Applied Mathematics, 187:41–49, 2015.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt.
Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness.
Social Choice and Welfare, 45(4):793–804, 2015.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, M. Brill, and J. Mestre.
Computational aspects of random serial dictatorship.
ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 13(2):26–30, 2014.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
Minimal retentive sets in tournaments.
Social Choice and Welfare, 42(3):551–574, 2014.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig.
Computing desirable partitions in additively separable hedonic
games.
Artificial Intelligence, 195:316–334, 2013.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein.
Pareto optimality in coalition formation.
Games and Economic Behavior, 82:562–581, 2013.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
On the rate of convergence of fictitious play.
Theory of Computing Systems, 53(1):41–52, 2013.
Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory.
[ link |
pdf ]
D. Baumeister, F. Brandt, F. Fischer, J. Hoffmann, and J. Rothe.
The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering
sets.
Theory of Computing Systems, 53(3):467–502, 2013.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill.
The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship.
Economics Letters, 121(3):341–345, 2013.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Chudnovsky, I. Kim, G. Liu, S. Norin, A. Scott, P. Seymour, and
S. Thomassé.
A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz.
Social Choice and Welfare, 40(3):739–743, 2013.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum
games.
Theory of Computing Systems, 49(1):162–181, 2011.
Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and J. Hoffmann.
The computational complexity of weak saddles.
Theory of Computing Systems, 49(1):139–161, 2011.
Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer.
Equilibria of graphical games with symmetries.
Theoretical Computer Science, 412:675–685, 2011.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt.
Minimal stable sets in tournaments.
Journal of Economic Theory, 146(4):1481–1499, 2011.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein.
Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability.
Journal of Economic Theory, 146(4):1721–1731, 2011.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and M. Mair.
A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set.
Social Choice and Welfare, 34(4):597–609, 2010.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein.
Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional
games.
Theory and Decision, 69(2):233–256, 2010.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer.
Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium.
Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 75(3):163–177, 2009.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
The computational complexity of choice sets.
Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 55(4):444–459, 2009.
Special Issue on Computational Social Choice.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt.
Some remarks on Dodgson's voting rule.
Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 55(4):460–463, 2009.
Special Issue on Computational Social Choice.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and J. Hoffmann.
Computing Shapley's saddles.
ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 8(2), 2009.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and Y. Shoham.
Ranking games.
Artificial Intelligence, 173(2):221–239, 2009.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and T. Sandholm.
On the existence of unconditionally privacy-preserving auction
protocols.
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 11(2),
2008.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and F. Fischer.
Computing the minimal covering set.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 56(2):254–268, 2008.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt.
How to obtain full privacy in auctions.
International Journal of Information Security, 5(4):201–216,
2006.
[ link |
pdf ]
CONFERENCE PUBLICATIONS AND OTHER PAPERS
F. Brandt, M. Greger, E. Segal-Halevi, and W. Suksompong.
Optimal budget aggregation with single-peaked preferences.
In Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and
Computation (ACM-EC), 2024.
Forthcoming.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Greger, E. Segal-Halevi, and W. Suksompong.
Balanced donor coordination.
In Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and
Computation (ACM-EC), page 299, 2023.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and S. Tausch.
Strategyproof social decision schemes on super Condorcet
domains.
In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1734–1742, 2023.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and W. Suksompong.
Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison
preferences.
In Proceedings of the 31st International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 130–136, 2022.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen.
Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for
strategyproof social decision schemes.
In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 181–189, 2022.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and L. Tappe.
Single-agent dynamics in additively separable hedonic games.
In Proceedings of the 36th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 4867–4874, 2022.
[ pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, M. Greger, D. Peters, C. Stricker, and W. Suksompong.
Funding public projects: A case for the Nash product rule.
In Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Web and
Internet Economics (WINE), 2021.
[ pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, D. Peters, and C. Stricker.
Distribution rules under dichotomous preferences: Two out of
three ain't bad.
In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and
Computation (ACM-EC), pages 158–179, 2021.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer.
On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice
functions.
In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 251–259, 2021.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and A. Wilczynski.
Reaching individually stable coalition structures in hedonic
games.
In Proceedings of the 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 5211–5218, 2021.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and M. Bullinger.
Finding and recognizing popular coalition structures.
In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 195–203, 2020.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and A. Wilczynski.
On the convergence of swap dynamics to Pareto-optimal
matchings.
In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Web and
Internet Economics (WINE), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages
100–113. Springer-Verlag, 2019.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, J. Hofbauer, and M. Strobel.
Exploring the no-show paradox for Condorcet extensions using
Ehrhart theory and computer simulations.
In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 520–528, 2019.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, C. Saile, and C. Stricker.
Voting with ties: Strong impossibilities via SAT solving.
In Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1285–1293, 2018.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Stricker.
An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery
schemes.
In Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 114–120, 2018.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, J. Hofbauer, and M. Suderland.
Majority graphs of assignment problems and properties of popular
random assignments.
In Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 335–343, 2017.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer.
Random assignment with optional participation.
In Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 326–334, 2017.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Geist.
Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness
via SMT solving.
In Proceedings of the 25th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 116–122, 2016.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, J. Hofbauer, and M. Suderland.
Majority graphs of assignment problems and properties of popular
random assignments.
In Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on
Computational Social Choice (COMSOC), 2016.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, C. Geist, and M. Strobel.
Analyzing the practical relevance of voting paradoxes via
Ehrhart theory, computer simulations, and empirical data.
In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 385–393, 2016.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, C. Geist, and D. Peters.
Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving.
In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 314–322, 2016.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and H. G. Seedig.
On the discriminative power of tournament solutions.
In Selected Papers of the International Conference on Operations
Research, OR2014, Operations Research Proceedings, pages 53–58.
Springer-Verlag, 2016.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, C. Geist, and J. Hofbauer.
Strategic abstention based on preference extensions: Positive
results and computer-generated impossibilities.
In Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 18–24, 2015.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, G. Chabin, and C. Geist.
Pnyx: A powerful and user-friendly tool for preference
aggregation.
In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1915–1916, 2015.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer.
Incentives for participation and abstention in probabilistic
social choice.
In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1411–1419, 2015.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and M. Strobel.
Fractional hedonic games: Individual and group stability.
In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1219–1227, 2015.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, and H. G. Seedig.
Minimal extending sets in tournaments.
In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1539–1540, 2014.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein.
Fractional hedonic games.
In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 5–12, 2014.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt.
On the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in
randomized social choice.
In Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 545–551, 2014.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, C. Geist, and H. G. Seedig.
Identifying k-majority digraphs via SAT solving.
In Proceedings of the 1st AAMAS Workshop on Exploring Beyond the
Worst Case in Computational Social Choice (EXPLORE), 2014.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein.
Extending tournament solutions.
In Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 580–586, 2014.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt.
Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility
functions.
In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and
Computation (ACM-EC), pages 331–332, 2014.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and C. Geist.
Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT
solving.
In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1193–1200, 2014.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill.
The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship.
In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Web and
Internet Economics (WINE), volume 8289 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science (LNCS), pages 24–25. Springer-Verlag, 2013.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Stursberg.
On popular random assignments.
In Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Algorithmic
Game Theory (SAGT), volume 8146 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(LNCS), pages 183–194. Springer-Verlag, 2013.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, K. Kardel, and H. G. Seedig.
It only takes a few: On the hardness of voting with a constant
number of agents.
In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 375–382, 2013.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and H. G. Seedig.
A tournament of order 24 with two disjoint TEQ-retentive
sets.
Technical report, https://arxiv.org/abs/1302.5592, 2013.
[ link |
pdf ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill.
On the tradeoff between economic efficiency and
strategyproofness in randomized social choice.
In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 455–462, 2013.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and M. Brill.
Computing dominance-based solution concepts.
In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
(ACM-EC), page 233, 2012.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
From Arrow's impossibility to Schwartz's tournament
equilibrium set (Invited tutorial).
In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on
Relational and Algebraic Methods in Computer Science, volume 6663 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 50–51. Springer-Verlag,
2011.
[ link ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig.
Optimal partitions in additively separable hedonic games.
In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 43–48, 2011.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig.
Stable partitions in additively separable hedonic games.
In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 183–190, 2011.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein.
Pareto optimality in coalition formation.
In Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Algorithmic
Game Theory (SAGT), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 93–104.
Springer-Verlag, 2011.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Group-strategyproof irresolute social choice functions.
In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 79–84, 2011.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, and H. G. Seedig.
On the fixed-parameter tractability of composition-consistent
tournament solutions.
In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 85–90, 2011.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and M. Brill.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the strategyproofness of
irresolute social choice functions.
In Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of
Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), pages 136–142, 2011.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
Minimal retentive sets in tournaments.
In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 47–54, 2010.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein.
Monotone cooperative games and their threshold versions.
In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1017–1024, 2010.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
On the rate of convergence of fictitious play.
In Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium on Algorithmic
Game Theory (SAGT), number 6386 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS),
pages 102–113. Springer-Verlag, 2010.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer.
On iterated dominance, matrix elimination, and matched paths.
In Proceedings of the 27th International Symposium on
Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), Leibniz International
Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), pages 107–118. LZI, 2010.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
D. Baumeister, F. Brandt, F. Fischer, J. Hoffmann, and J. Rothe.
The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering
sets.
In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Algorithms
and Complexity (CIAC), number 6078 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(LNCS), pages 299–310. Springer-Verlag, 2010.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. A. Hemaspaandra.
Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time
algorithms for single-peaked electorates.
In Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 715–722, 2010.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Tournament solutions – Extensions of maximality and their
applications to decision-making.
Habilitation Thesis, Faculty for Mathematics, Computer Science, and
Statistics, University of Munich, 2009.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum
games.
In Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic
Game Theory (SAGT), volume 5814 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(LNCS), pages 287–298. Springer-Verlag, 2009.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
Computational aspects of Shapley's saddles.
In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 209–216, 2009.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and J. Hoffmann.
The computational complexity of weak saddles.
In Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic
Game Theory (SAGT), volume 5814 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(LNCS), pages 238–249. Springer-Verlag, 2009.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer.
Equilibria of graphical games with symmetries.
In Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and
Network Economics (WINE), volume 5385 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science (LNCS), pages 198–209. Springer-Verlag, 2008.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and M. Mair.
A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set.
In Proceedings of the 23rd AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 38–43, 2008.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and F. Fischer.
On the hardness and existence of quasi-strict equilibria.
In Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic
Game Theory (SAGT), volume 4997 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(LNCS), pages 291–302. Springer-Verlag, 2008.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Minimal stable sets in tournaments.
Technical report, https://arxiv.org/abs/0803.2138, 2008.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and F. Fischer.
PageRank as a weak tournament solution.
In Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Internet and
Network Economics (WINE), volume 4858 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science (LNCS), pages 300–305. Springer-Verlag, 2007.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, T. Sandholm, and Y. Shoham.
Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auctions.
In Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1207–1214, 2007.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and Y. Shoham.
A game-theoretic analysis of strictly competitive multiagent
scenarios.
In Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1199–1206, 2007.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein.
The computational complexity of choice sets.
In Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of
Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), pages 82–91, 2007.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and F. Fischer.
Computational aspects of covering in dominance graphs.
In Proceedings of the 22nd AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 694–699, 2007.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
P. Harrenstein, F. Brandt, and F. Fischer.
Commitment and extortion.
In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 108–115, 2007.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer.
Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium.
In Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on
Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 4393 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 212–223. Springer-Verlag, 2007.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and Y. Shoham.
On strictly competitive multi-player games.
In Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 605–612, 2006.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and T. Sandholm.
Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy.
In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 357–364, 2005.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and T. Sandholm.
On correctness and privacy in distributed mechanisms.
In Revised selected papers from the 7th AAMAS Workshop on
Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC), volume 3937 of Lecture Notes
in Artificial Intelligence (LNAI), pages 212–225, 2005.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and T. Sandholm.
Unconditional privacy in social choice.
In Proceedings of the 10th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of
Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), pages 207–218, 2005.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and T. Sandholm.
Efficient privacy-preserving protocols for multi-unit auctions.
In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Financial
Cryptography and Data Security (FC), volume 3570 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science (LNCS), pages 298–312. Springer-Verlag, 2005.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Efficient cryptographic protocol design based on distributed
El Gamal encryption.
In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on
Information Security and Cryptology (ICISC), volume 3935 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 32–47. Springer-Verlag, 2005.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and T. Sandholm.
(Im)possibility of unconditionally privacy-preserving
auctions.
In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 810–817. IEEE Computer Society
Press, 2004.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds.
In Proceedings of the 7th Annual Conference on Financial
Cryptography (FC), volume 2742 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(LNCS), pages 223–238. Springer-Verlag, 2003.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Social choice and preference protection - Towards fully
private mechanism design.
In Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
(ACM-EC), pages 220–221, 2003.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Private public choice.
Technical Report FKI-247-03, Department of Computer Science,
Technical University of Munich (TUM), 2003.
ISSN 0941-6358.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt.
Fundamental aspects of privacy and deception in electronic
auctions.
Doctoral Thesis, Department for Computer Science, Technical
University of Munich, 2003.
[ link |
errata ]
F. Brandt.
Secure and private auctions without auctioneers.
Technical Report FKI-245-02, Department of Computer Science,
Technical University of Munich (TUM), 2002.
ISSN 0941-6358.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt.
A verifiable, bidder-resolved auction protocol.
In Proceedings of the 5th AAMAS Workshop on Deception, Fraud and
Trust in Agent Societies (Special Track on Privacy and Protection with
Multi-Agent Systems), 2002.
[ pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and G. Weiß.
Antisocial agents and Vickrey auctions.
In Intelligent Agents VIII, volume 2333 of Lecture Notes
in Artificial Intelligence (LNAI), pages 335–347. Springer-Verlag, 2001.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and G. Weiß.
Vicious strategies for Vickrey auctions.
In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents, pages 71–72, 2001.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Cryptographic protocols for secure second-price auctions.
In Cooperative Information Agents V, volume 2182 of
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (LNAI), pages 154–165.
Springer-Verlag, 2001.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt.
Antisocial bidding in repeated Vickrey auctions.
Technical Report FKI-241-00, Department of Computer Science,
Technical University of Munich (TUM), 2000.
ISSN 0941-6358.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt and G. Weiß.
Exploring auction-based leveled commitment contracting. Part
III: Vickrey-type auctioning.
Technical Report FKI-238-00, Department of Computer Science,
Technical University of Munich (TUM), 2000.
ISSN 0941-6358.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt, W. Brauer, and G. Weiß.
Task assignment in multiagent systems based on Vickrey-type
auctioning and leveled commitment contracting.
In Cooperative Information Agents IV, volume 1860 of
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (LNAI), pages 95–106.
Springer-Verlag, 2000.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and G. Weiß.
Exploring auction-based leveled commitment contracting. Part
II: Dutch-type auctioning.
Technical Report FKI-237-00, Department of Computer Science,
Technical University of Munich (TUM), 2000.
ISSN 0941-6358.
[ link |
pdf ]
S. Schulz and F. Brandt.
Using term space maps to capture search control knowledge in
equational theorem proving.
In Proceedings of the 12th Florida Artificial Intelligence
Research Society Conference (FLAIRS), pages 244–248, 1999.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt and G. Weiß.
Exploring auction-based leveled commitment contracting. Part
I: English-type auctioning.
Technical Report FKI-234-99, Department of Computer Science,
Technical University of Munich (TUM), 1999.
ISSN 0941-6358.
[ link |
pdf ]
F. Brandt.
Example selection for learning in automated theorem proving.
Diploma Thesis, Department for Computer Science, Technical
University of Munich, 1998.
[ pdf ]
Non-Scientific Publications
F. Brandt. Wie programmiere ich eine optimierte Linienroutine in Assembler?. TOS (Magazin plus Software für den Atari ST & TT), 07/93, 1993. [ jpg ]
F. Brandt. "Fullscreen"-Programming on the Atari ST. Maggie, Issue #10, 1993. [ txt ]
F. Brandt. Die Tricks der Fullscreen-Programmierung. TOS (Magazin plus Software für den Atari ST & TT), 02/92, 1992. [ jpg ]
